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Playing "21" with Narcotics Enforcement:
A Response to Professor Carrington
Frank 0 Bowman, 111*
I confess. I have been a "drug warrior." At least if the term includes
serving as an Assistant Umted States Attorney in Miami and prosecuting,
and seeking long prison terms for, narcotics traffickers. It was therefore
with considerable personal interest that I listened to Professor Carrington
present his assessment of this country's drug policy in the Forty-Sixth
Randolph Tucker Lecture.' It is not often, after all, that one is accused of
belonging to the modern equivalent of the Inquisition2 or of serving a legal
system whose brutality places its officials on the same moral footing as
Nazi war criminals.3
Although I disagree with Professor Carrington's approach and
suggested remedy, he raises important issues worthy of thoughtful debate.
At the core of his speech are two questions which should not be ignored:
First, is the evil of drug abuse exceeded by the costs, both human and
financial, of the strategy the country has adopted to prevent drug abuse?
* Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, and Visiting Professor
of Law, 1994-95, at the Washington & Lee University School of Law. I am inexpressibly
grateflul to the Washington & Lee University Law School community for welcoming me into
their ranks, as well as to the Frances Lewis Law Center of Washington & Lee University for
its support of this project. I am particularly indebted to Professors Samuel W Calhoun,
William S. Geimer, and Roger D. Groot, as well as to Herbert D. Bowman, Deputy District
Attorney, San Diego, California, and Robert C. Bowman, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department
of Justice, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to my
research assistant, Stephen P Withee, for his tireless research of occasionally obscure topics.
The views expressed herein are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the United States Department of Justice.
1. Professor Paul D. Carrington, The Twenty First Wisdom, Forty-Sixth Annual
Washington and Lee University School of Law Tucker Lecture (September 30, 1994), in 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV 333 [hereinafter Carrington].
2. Id. at 352.
3. Id.
937
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Second, assuming one were to conclude that the costs of our present policy
are too high, how should the policy be changed?
4
Professor Carrington's answer to the first question is an emphatic "yes."
He thinks the costs of prevention are far worse than the disease. His
prescription for the problem is a constitutional amendment eliminating the
federal role in drug law enforcement, and by analogy to the Twenty-First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which repealed the earlier national
prohibition of alcohol, giving the states exclusive power to regulate heroin,
cocaine, marijuana, tobacco, coffee, and tea.5
A careful reading of Professor Carrington's text has given rise to three
categories of reflection:
First, while the argument that the cost of drug enforcement outweighs
its benefits is not a frivolous one, Professor Carrington has larded that
central argument with unexamined inferences, doubtful logic, questionable
uses of history, persistent hyperbole, and some plain factual errors.
Second, even if one accepts the premise that the costs of crimmalizing
narcotics exceed the costs of unrestrained drug use, Professor Carrington's
solution - individual state control - fails to solve the problem. His
solution would not eliminate the principal source of the collateral harms of
the drug trade: a hugely profitable, violent, national and international
criminal industry Indeed, the very interstate and international character of
the drug trade places the drug problem among the categories of crime least
susceptible to attack through a resurgent federalism.
Third, despite the form in which Professor Carrington has cast it, his
core argument retains considerable visceral force. Much of that force,
paradoxically, flows from the failure of the metaphor chosen by those who
would increase law enforcement efforts against narcotics trafficking - the
deeply regrettable idea of a "war on drugs."
Although I have fundamental disagreements with Professor Carrington
even when his argument is reduced to its core, my purpose here is neither
to defend every jot and tittle of national drug policy, nor to propose any
sweeping personal vision of the place of recreational drugs in America. My
ambitions are more modest. I suggest three premises: (1) Intelligent
discussion of drug policy requires that we shed the image of law enforcement
as warfare. (2) Instead, criminal narcotics prohibitions, penalties, and
enforcement methods should be analyzed by the same standards which
4. This paper tracks Professor Carrington's approach by taking a utilitarian
perspective. I assume that substances that cause a sufficient degree of harm to their users and
to society are the proper subject of government regulation or prohibition.
5. Carrington, supra note 1, at 340-41.
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govern any other type of crime. (3) If antinarc-tics policies are conceived
and crafted as ordinary law enforcement measures, the result is more likely
to be humane, sustainable, and successful than either utopian legalization
schemes or Wagnerian blitzkriegs against the evil drug lords among us.
L Cleanng Away the Underbrush
A continuing theme of Professor Carrmgton's remarks is that those who
favor increased dedication to narcotics law enforcement overstate the
harmful consequences of using those drugs.6 Although there is undoubtedly
some truth to this claim, making it would seem to impose an obligation to
respond to alleged demagoguery in measured and reasonable tones. The first
flaw in Professor Carrmgton's presentation is that he is plainly prepared to
out-herod Herod.7  So before turning to those aspects of Professor
Carrington's argument which bear serious consideration, let us clear away
the obstructions and diversions with which he has surrounded them.
A. Coffee, Tea, and Tobacco: Plants as Red Hemngs
The first diversionary briar patch to be razed is the inclusion in
Professor Carrington's proposed constitutional amendment of references'to
coffee, tea, and tobacco. None of these products are illegal under federal
law,8 and of the three substances, states regulate only tobacco, and then only
its sale to minors. 9 There is no serious proposal at either the federal or state
level to ban consumption of coffee, tea, or tobacco.
Moreover, to categorize coffee, tea, and tobacco as "mind-altering
substances" is, while technically accurate, to distort that phrase beyond
6. Professor Carrington puts it rather more strongly. At one point, he writes:
Because drug law enforcement officers are often required to do such distasteful
deeds, they tend to rationalize their own conduct with exaggerated beliefs about
the horrors of cannabis, opiates and coca. For these reasons, the enforcement
industry is a source of disinformation about drugs that is almost as abundant as
the substances themselves and exceeds in its harmful consequences any disinforma-
tion that may have been disseminated by the tobacco industry.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
7 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
8. Federal law does restrict the award of certain block grants for mental health and
substance abuse treatment to states that have enacted legislation prohibiting the sale of tobacco
to minors, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), but there is no positive federal
prohibition on the sale of coffee, tea, or tobacco to any group.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-3 (1994); COLO. REV STAT. § 18-13-121 (Cum.
Supp. 1994).
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useful limits. True, the active ingredients of these products, caffeine and
nicotine, are stimulants. True, both are addictive to varying degrees,
caffeine mildly and nicotine extremely But to put them in the same
category as alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin seems, at first glance,
either foolish or facetious.
Professor Carrington is no fool, and he obviously is.aware of the
profound differences between a sip of Earl Grey and a drag on a crack
pipe. He is equally aware that no one is on the verge of cnnunalizing a
cup of java and a smoke. So why are coffee, tea, and tobacco keeping
house m his constitutional amendment with marijuana, cocaine, and heroin?
They are there, to be frank, so that the argument in favor of the amendment
can be laden with reasoning by false analogy, or to be more precise, with
attempts to persuade by unexamined inference.
Professor Carnngton begins his presentation with six "factual
premises" held by his fictional Fremonters 0 which are, he says, at odds
with the "mania causing widespread blindness to the facts" about opium,
cocaine, and marijuana." The first two of these premises are that the use
and misuse of "mind-altering substances" are "universal" and "pre-
historic." 2 At first blush, of course, neither the universality or antiquity
of any particular strain of criminal conduct is much of an argument
for legalizing it. If it were, we should be obliged to take a rather more
broad-minded and tolerant view of murder,1 3 rape, 14 robbery,15 theft, prosti-
10. Professor Carnngton posits an imaginary "State of Fremont" whose inhabitants seek
abolition of federal restraints on possession and sale of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, and
who would decriminalize these substances within their borders. Carrington, supra note 1,
at 342.
I. Id. at 343.
12. Id. at 343-44. -
13. Those Fremonters who accept the literal truth of the Bible know that the third
human being in God's creation, Cain, promptly and efficiently killed the fourth, Abel.
Genesis 4:8. Those who prefer a Darwinian view of human origins are aware of the school
of anthropological thought which holds that the aggressive, indeed homicidal, character of
homo sapiens has been integral to our evolutionary success. See, e.g., RICHARD B. LEE &
IVAN DEVORE, MAN THE HUNTER (1968).
14. From the Roman soldiery among the Sabine women to the rape camps of the
Bosnian Serbs, human males have been forcing themselves on women with depressing
regularity See TITUS LIVIUS, THE HISTORY OF ROME 23-24 (George Baker trans., 1836);
John F Bums, 150 Muslims Say Serbs Raped Them in Bosnia, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992,
§ 1, at 5.
15. Even the most cherished Christian parable of decent behavior, the story of the Good
Samaritan, is the tale of how the despised Samaritan succors a Jew who has been beaten,
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tution," and cheating the tax collector, all of which have ancient and
dishonorable pedigrees. But by including tea, coffee, and tobacco among
the "mind-altering substances," Professor Carrington subtly alters this
obviously untenable position. Their inclusion allows Professor Carrington
to do three things.
First, it allows him to broaden his claim of umversal use of "mind-
altering substances" far beyond anything which could be sustained by
considering the true subjects of the dispute: marijuana, cocaine, and
heroin.'
7
Second, without ever saying so directly, Professor Carrmngton invites
us to apply that most basic of legal norms: Like things should be treated
alike. Because almost everyone drinks coffee or tea legally and with no ill
effects, we are invited to conclude that the same treatment should be
extended to the other "natural" mind-altering substances - marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin. The obvious problem is that coffee and tea are not
"like" marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. To include coffee and tea m the
same category with illegal drugs is to commit an error of degree so large
that it amounts to an error of land. Thus, the legal norm on which we are
impliedly invited to rely is irrelevant.
Third, including tobacco allows Professor Carrington to invite another
misleading sub rosa comparison. His third "factual premise" is that, of his
six selected substances, tobacco is the most dangerous to physical health.'"
stripped, and left for dead by robbers. Luke 10:29-37
16. Whether the "oldest profession" really is may be debatable, but that men and
women have been exchanging sex for money since time out of mind is not.
17 For example, Professor Carrington writes: "Because the human appetite for mmd-
alteration is wide-spread, in 1994, there must be several billion users of the so-called
Protestant drug, caffeine, which is extracted from the tea leaf or the coffee bean. In addition,
there may be a billion users of the tobacco leaf." Carrington, supra note 1, at 343.
18. Id. at 345. Whether long-term tobacco use really is worse for one's health than
long-term use of marijuana, cocaine, or heroin is not at all clear. Serious researchers m the
area recognize both that the nature of the ill effects of tobacco has only recently become well
understood after many years of study and that comparable data for long-term use of
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is not available. See Steven Jonas, The U.S. Drug Problem
and the U.S. Drug Culture: A Public Health Solution, in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE
161, 164 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1991) (epidemiological data on heroin, cocaine, and
marijuana is much more rare than for alcohol and tobacco); LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B.
BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL EVOLUTION 145 (rev ed. 1985) ("The
physiological effects of chronic administration of large doses of cocaine have never been
studied systematically in human beings."). The existing evidence regarding marijuana, for
example, is that it causes equal or greater damage to the respiratory system than does
tobacco. James A. Inciardi & Duane C. McBride, The Case Against Legalization, in THE
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His fourth premise is that tobacco is the most addictive of the chosen six.19
Even assuming his third and fourth premises to be true, neither of these
observations is relevant to a discussion of the legalization of marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin, unless there is some lesson to be drawn from
contrasting the legal status of tobacco to that of the three illegal drugs.
Curiously, Professor Carrington never spells out what that lesson should
be. I suggest that the lesson we are being invited to draw is this: Since we
know that tobacco is (a) addictive, (b) harmful, and (c) legl, the federal
government should be barred from prohibiting or regulating the use of
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin because they are no more addictive and
arguably less harmful than tobacco. There are a number of difficulties with
this suggestion; I will amplify on only two of the most salient.
The first difficulty is that, once again, Professor Carrington has us
comparing apples with oranges. Marijuana, cocaine, and heroin are banned
in part, no doubt, because they are to varying degrees addictive, and in
part, no doubt, because they have long term deleterious health effects.
However, at least as important to the rationale for their prohibition is that
they are intoxicants. They are disapproved because they really do "alter
the mind." They significantly affect the user's ability to perceive the
physical world accurately and his ability to formulate rational responses to
DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 45, 49-50 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1991). Crack cocaine is
linked to a plethora of problems: pulmonary disorders, seizures, strokes, hypertension,
paranoia, hallucinations, etc. STEVEN R. BELENKO, CRACK AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-
DRUG POLICY 34-41 (1993). In 1991, there were over 100,000 cocaine related medical
emergencies reported to the Drug Abuse Warning Network system. James A. Inciardi,
Against Legalization of Drugs, in LEGALIZE IT9 169 n.3 (1993).
19 Carrington, supra note 1, at 346. I have found no credible authority to support this
claim. The truth appears to be both uncertain and complex. On the one hand, tobacco was
long classified as habit-forming, causing psychological dependence, but nonaddictive. Only
fairly recently have medical investigations confirmed physical and biochemical changes
occurring in some tobacco smokers as a result of withdrawal. JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST
DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1983). On the other hand, daily use of heroin for
as little as 10-14 days appears to create a physical dependence which causes withdrawal
symptoms on cessation of the drug. Id. at 27; DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE:
OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA BEFORE 1940 47-48 (1982). One author maintains that
cocaine is the most addictive drug in the world. JOHN C. FLYNN, COCAINE: AN IN-DEPTH
LOOK AT THE FACTS, SCIENCE, HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD'S MOST ADDICTIVE
DRUG 12-16 (1991). Another author has reviewed clinical studies and concluded that
'approximately 10 per cent of those who begin to use cocaine 'recreationally' will go on to
serious, heavy, chronic, compulsive use." Inciardi, in LEGALIZE IT?, supra note 18, at 169.
One survey of the medical literature characterizes cigarette tobacco, heroin, and "crack" as
"obligatory addictive drug[s]." Jonas, supra note 18, at 162. Which of the three is the
"most" addictive is susceptible to lengthy argument, but probably not to proof.
PLAYING "21" WITH NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT
what he perceives.20 Regardless of whether one thinks society in general,
or the federal government in particular, has any proper concern with such
matters, these concerns do matter greatly to those who oppose drugs. To
put it more plainly, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin are banned at least as
much because they intoxicate as because they kill. Tobacco is simply not
an intoxicant.2" Thus, while tobacco is both addictive and harmful, it no
more belongs in a category called "mmd-altenng drugs" than do tea and
coffee.
Second, though tobacco is not a "mind-altering drug," it may not be
irrelevant to a discussion of what to do about marijuana, cocaine, and
heroin that a substance as dangerous as tobacco is legal. That we ban
marijuana, for instance, while paying a federal crop subsidy to producers
of a product that contributes to the deaths of some 419,000 Americans
annually22 is a paradox. But to note a paradox is not the same thing as
making an argument. Professor Carrington describes the paradox well
enough, and he tells us his solution - a constitutional amendment. He is
notably silent, however, on the principle of logic, public policy, or sound
constitution-making that leads from the paradox to the amendment.
Even accepting Professor Carrington's characterization of tobacco as
a greater evil than hard drugs,23 it is unclear why the entrenched presence
of one great evil obliges us to accept any lesser evil wich may thereafter
threaten. Moreover, a principle of general application which resolves the
paradox of legal tobacco and illegal drugs requires either (a) the prohibition
of tobacco or (b) the legalization of any substance which is less harmful to
health than tobacco (regardless of whether the substance has effects on the
central nervous system equal to or greater than mcotine). Professor
Carrington obviously is not advocating prohibition of tobacco. On the
20. For a careful and dispassionate description of the intoxicating effects of heroin, for
example, see KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 22-25. For a similar description of the effects of
cocaine, see FLYNN, supra note 19, at 47-67
21. I use the terms "intoxicant" or "intoxicate" in their ordinary senses, not as medical
or toxicological terms of art. For example, II WEBSTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1185 (1993), defines "intoxicate" as "to excite or stupefy by alcoholic drinks
or a narcotic esp. to the point where physical and mental control is markedly diminished."
The MODEL PENAL CODE defines "intoxication" as "[a] disturbance of mental or physical
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body " MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.08(5)(a) (1985).
22. Wayne Hearn, Emptying the World's Ashtrays: International Medical Community
May Support Smokng Cessation Policy, AM. MED. NEws, Oct. 3, 1994, at 13, 14 (quoting
statistics from World Health Organization, CDC, Judith Mackay, MD).
23. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 345-46 (discussing dangers of tobacco).
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other hand, given the demonstrated lethality of tobacco and the plethora of
substances less lethal than smoking cigarettes, honest application of
principle (b) would require dismantling the Food and Drug Adimmstration
right along with the DEA.
Professor Carrington would, I am sure, protest that he intends no
change so sweeping, that the only presently banned substances his
constitutional amendment would touch are marijuana, cocaine, and opium
derivatives. The question, however, is why only these? If the federal
government is to be stripped of jurisdiction over marijuana, cocaine, and
heroin because they are less harmful to health than tobacco, why should the
same treatment not be accorded to methamphetamme ("speed"), barbitu-
rates, "angel dust," LSD, "Ecstasy," and the whole pharmacopeia of mind-
altering substances which may warp your tunking, but which will not cause
cancer'?
B. Through a Glass Very Darkly: Correcting Professor
Camngton 's Misleading Account of the History of Drugs
The apparent answer to the puzzle of Professor Carrngton's eclectic
selection of drugs to be de-federalized is his characterization of these drugs
as "natural" substances whose use is widespread and ancient. He writes:
The six substances that I propose to add contain the five mind-altering
substances in addition to alcohol that appear in nature and have for
millenma been widely used by men and women. The mind-altering
effect of all of these substances can be derived without the use of any
modem technology or process. Until 1914, the use of all of them was
lawful in every American state.24
Professor Carrington goes on to paint a picture of a world in which
post-1914 America is an aberrant island of Calvinist prudery on the great
historical canvas of a happily, and organically, stoned humanity Roman
banqueters munching the period equivalent of magic brownies. Medieval
Arab tokers. Cheerful Incan peasants and their even cheerier llamas.
Sigmund Freud. Industrious, opium-smoking Chinese coolies. Sherlock
Holmes. Laudanum-swilling housewives. And even a coked-up Ulysses
24. Id. at 341. In 1914, the Harrison Act was passed imposing federal regulation on
a number of substances. Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). In fact, as we will see
later, the assertion that use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin "was lawful in every American
state" before 1914 is wrong. States began regulating the use of these substances as early as
the 1870s. Infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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S. Grant. It is an interesting portrait, with enough elements of truth to lend
it vensimilitude. It is, however, a notable distortion of history
Consider the claims that the substances to be de-federalized are
"natural" and their use and abuse by humans "ancient." It is true that
marijuana, coca, and opium poppies are all plants. It is equally true that
the intoxicating effect of marijuana is produced by smoking or eating it
without chemical alteration of the plant. But although marijuana may be
natural enough and may have been known to various civilizations for a long
time, its use m American and European culture is a very recent phenome-
non. It has no significant tenure in the United States before this century I
As for those derivatives of the coca plant and the opium poppy which are
the core of America's drug problem, they are neither natural nor ancient.
One cannot throw the mantle of "nature" over cocaine and heroin simply
because their vegetable antecedents have narcotic or analgesic properties.
The debate that embroils America is not about coca leaves or opium resin.
What concerns us are the drugs in actual use - cocaine and heroin - and
these are products of modem organic chemistry vastly different in purity,
chemical composition, and effect than anything found in nature.
Cocaine is derived from the coca bush, Erythroxylum coca, a plant
indigenous to Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.26 Thus, the plant was necessar-
ily unknown to European civilization until roughly 1533, the year Francisco
Pizarro conquered Peru? For the next three centuries, there were some
25. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING
OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 44-45 (1993).
In 1919, during congressional hearings on federal drug control policy, Dr. William Jay
Schiefflin of New York testified that cannabis was "used only to a slight extent m this
country " Importation and Use of Opium: Hearngs Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1919).
See also People v Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). Defendants were charged with
robbing marijuana cultivators of their plants. The defendants contended that standing crops
could not be the subject of a robbery Id. at 704. In the course of rejecting defendants'
argument, the California Supreme Court discussed the 1872 California larceny statute which
included standing crops among the proper subjects of larceny-
Had the Legislature anticipated in 1872 that the meteoric rise in popularity and
hence in value of an illicit plant would lead to violent confrontations between black
market cultivators and armed bandits, we have no doubt it would have explicitly
applied the rule to robbery as well.
Id. at 706.
26. 3 BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 417 (15th ed. 1993).
27 Some references to coca leaf chewing by indigenous South Americans appear in
early correspondence from the conquistadores. See, for example, the rather dismissive
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references to coca and its properties in European botanical literature, but
the plant itself was essentially unknown either to medical science or to
seekers of pleasure. 28 Active medical experimentation with coca does not
seem to have begun until the 1850s, and recreational use in Europe and
North America came still later.29 The principal active alkaloid of the coca
plant, cocaine, was not isolated until 1860.30 "Crack," a smokable form of
cocaine that produces faster and more intense highs,31 did not appear for
human consumption in the United States until the 1980s.32
Opium is the dried, milky exudate obtained from the unripe seedpods
of the poppy plant.33 The method for isolating opium's principal alkaloid,
morphine, was discovered by the German chemst, F W Serturner,
in 18033' and was first published in 1817 " Heroin, or diacetylmorphine,
which is four to eight times as potent as morphine, was not developed until
1874;36 it was not given the name "heroin" or tested on human subjects
until 1898.' 7 Moreover, the most efficacious, and among addicts ultimately
most common, method of introducing morphine and heroin into the human
remarks of Pedro Cieza de Leon, who traveled and soldiered in South America from 1532
to 1550. Letter of Pedro Cieza, quoted in GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 17-18.
For a general discussion of the conquest of Peru, see HAMMOND INNES, THE CONQUISTADORS
(2d ed. 1986).
28. GRiNSPOON&BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 18-19 FLYNN, supra note 19, at 19-21.
29 GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 18-24, 37-38.
30. Id. at 19. The chemical formula of cocaine was first determined in 1862 by Wil-
helm Lossen. Id.
31. Crack is cocaine in its form as a base manufactured by heating powdered cocaine
hydrochloride with baking soda, ammonia, or powdered amphetamine. BELENKO, supra note
18, at 3.
32. Id. at 4-6.
33. KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 5. Opium has been recognized for several thousand
years and originally was consumed by drinking it in various liquids. Id. The device most
associated with opium, the pipe, was not commonly employed as a delivery mechanism until
after the discovery of America, whose native inhabitants were found using pipes to smoke
tobacco. Id. Opium smoking apparently began in Asia around the end of the 17th century
BRIAN INGLIS, THE OPIUM WAR 14-15 (1976).
34. KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 5; ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 38
(1982).
35. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 45.
36. TREBACH, supra note 34, at 39
37 5 BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 883 (15th ed. 1993). Heroin was pioneered by the
Bayer Company and was first used as an analgesic, but was soon abandoned when its
undesirable side-effects, principally rapid addiction, became clear. Id. See also TREBACH,
supra note 34, at 39-40 (1982).
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body, the hypodermic syringe, was not introduced into the United States
until 185638 and did not come into widespread use in the United States until
after the Civil War.39
To suggest that an addict's use of a hypodermic syringe to inject
himself with heroin is "natural" because heroin comes from the opium
poppy which is a plant is roughly the same as saying that the Brooklyn
Bridge is a natural phenomenon because steel comes from iron ore wich
is a rock.' In fact, both the syringe full of heroin and the Brooklyn Bridge
are products of late nineteenth century human technology, no less remote
from "nature" because they are old hat to us today
The truth about the history of marijuana, cocaine, and the opiate
derivatives is that the only period during wich these drugs were widely
and legally available to Americans and Europeans without prescription
began around the mid-1800s and was coming to a close at, or very shortly
after, the turn of the century Even in this narrow historical window, the
reality was far more complex, and far less laissez faire, than Professor
Camngton's pointillist portrait.
A full history of drugs in America and Europe in the nineteenth
century would require far more space than the confines of this discussion
permit,4 but a few illustrative points should suffice.
(1) Durng the 1800s, marijuana smoking was confined to a minuscule
percentage of the population of the United States and Northern Europe.42
(2) Cocaine was in vogue both as a general purpose medicine and
recreational stimulant between about 1880 and 1910."3 It was in 1884, for
example, that Sigmund Freud wrote his first monograph on cocame. 4
Freud made a number of claims for cocaine, among them that it was a cure
for morphine addiction. In a mere three years, Freud's enthusiasm for the
38. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 46. Two of the earliest American treatises on the
subject of hypodermic mjection were ANTOINE RUPPANER, HYPODERMIC INJECTIONS IN THE
TREATMENT OF NEURALGIA, RHEUMATISM, GOUT AND OTHER DISEA ES (1865) and ROBERTS
BARTHOLOW, MANUAL OF HYPODERMIC MEDICATION (1st ed. 1869).
39. COURTWRIGHTr, supra note 19, at 46; BARTHOLOW, supra note 38, at 18.
40. The Brooklyn Bridge was designed by John Augustus Roebling and built between
1869 and 1883. It was the first bridge to use steel for cable wire. 2 BRITANNICA
MICROPAEDIA 551 (15th ed. 1993).
41. For extensive treatment of the subject, see generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19,
and FLYNN, supra note 19, at 17-31.
42. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 25, at 44-45.
43. See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 21-41.
44. SIGMUND FREUD, ON COCA (1884).
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drug had waned. In July 1887, he wrote the last of Ins cocaine papers,
Craving For and Fear of Cocaine.45 In it, he conceded that cocaine should
not be used to treat morphine addicts because the resulting addiction to
cocaine that nught ensue is "a far more dangerous enemy to health than
morphine," producing quick physical and mental deterioration, paranoia,
and hallucinations.46
The shifts in Freud's position on cocaine, and even his lingering
ambivalence toward it, are emblematic of the real nineteenth century
experience with cocaine.47 Consider yet another example chosen by
45. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 33.
46. Sigmund Freud, Craving for and Fear of Cocaine, quoted and discussed in
GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 33. Freud himself apparently suffered no ill
effects from cocaine, and he continued to maintain that only morphine addicts were so weak-
willed that they would be susceptible to cocaine addiction. Id. at 33-34.
47 The other famous nineteenth century historical figure that Professor Carrington
associates with cocaine use on the job is, incredibly, General Ulysses S. Grant. Professor
Carrington writes that his Fremonters "suspect that Ulysses S. Grant fbught the Civil War
under the influence of cocaine." Carrington, supra note 1, at 347 So far as I am aware,
Professor Carrington is the first person in the 130 years since Appomattox to make this claim.
It is unsupported even by the source upon which he relies, DUKE & GROSS, supra note 25,
at 5. Duke and Gross write that, "Ulysses S. Grant was apparently a user of both morphine
and cocaine, as well as alcohol and tobacco." Id. They in turn cite RONALD K. SIEGEL,
INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE 262-65 (1989). Siegel makes no
reference whatsoever to cocaine use by General Grant during the Civil War.
The facts are these: General Grant did "use" cocaine, beginning in October 1884, when
Dr. John H. Douglas applied several preparations containing cocaine as topical anesthetics
to deaden the pain in the cancerous throat lesions which would kill the ex-President in July
1885. RICHARD GOLDHURST, MANY ARE THE HEARTS: THE AGONY AND THE TRIUMPH OF
ULYSSES S. GRANT 142-45, 186 (1975); SIEGEL, supra, at 263. Siegel alleges that General
Grant also was given coca derivatives orally by his physicians in the months before his death.
SIEGEL, supra, at 264. In addition, General Grant received morphine as an analgesic on the
day before he died, GOLDHURST, supra, at 228, and perhaps in the period immediately before
his death. SIEGEL, supra, at 264. The allegation that General Grant fought the war which
ended twenty years before his heroic struggle with cancer "under the influence of' cocaine
is absurd.
Moreover, the Civil War career of General Grant proves precisely the reverse of what
Professor Carrngton presumably intends to imply about the acceptability to Americans in the
middle of the nineteenth century of using intoxicants on thejob. Even in that hard-drinking
age, the report, never substantiated, that Grant had been drinking alcohol in the period
following the taking of Fort Donelson in 1862 contributed to his being removed from
command. WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 103-06, 109 (1980). The lobbying
of Grant's friends and Lincoln's need for generals who were not afraid of a fight returned
Grant to command. Id. at 108-10. Later the same year, the rumor that Grant had been
drinking during the Battle of Shiloh, combined with the unprecedented casualties of that
battle, once again cast Grant into disfavor. GENE SMITH, LEE AND GRANT 122 (1984);
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Professor Carrmgton of the attitudes of the time, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's
fictional detective, Sherlock Homes. Professor Carrington writes, "Vic-
torians were not shocked that Sherlock Holmes used [cocaine] to solve
crimes. " 48 To the contrary, that quintessential Victorian, Dr. John H.
Watson, took a very dim view of Holmes's cocaine use. In The Sign of the
Four, Dr. Watson observes Holmes injecting himself and protests vehem-
ently Holmes responds:
"Perhaps you are right, Watson," he said. "I suppose that its
influence is physically a bad one. I find it, however, so transcendently
stimulating and clarifyidg to the mind that its secondary action is a matter
of small moment."
"But consider!" I said earnestly "Count the cost! Your brain may,
as you say, be roused and excited, but it is a pathological and morbid
process which involves increased tissue-change and may at least leave a
permanent weakness. You know, too, what a black reaction comes upon
you. Surely the game is hardly worth the candle. Why should you, for
a mere passing pleasure, risk the loss of those great powers with which
you have been endowed? Remember that I speak not only as one comrade
to another but as a medical man ,,4
MCFEELY, supra, at 115. Only the urging of his friend William Tecumsah Sherman kept
Grant from resigning his commission. Id. at 118-21.
For the Civil War generation, drink and drugs taken on duty were seen, not as tolerable
foibles, but as the likely causes of failure. After the Union Army suffered defeat at
Chickamauga, its commander, General William S. Rosecrans was accused in the newspapers
of "eating opium and a great many other things." Letter of Mary A. Palmer, quoted in
CHARLES ROYSTER, THE DESTRUCTIVE WAR 239-240 (1991).
48. Carrington, supra note 1, at 344. Of course, as any Holmes aficionado knows,
Holmes only used cocaine when he had no crimes to solve; he injected the "seven-per-cent
solution" to stave off ennui between cases. See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Sign of the
Four, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 89-90 (Doubleday & Co. 1930) [hereinafter
COMPLETE HOLMES]. See also The Yellow Face, in COMPLETE HOLMES, supra, at 351.
49. COMPLETE HOLMES, supra note 48, at 89. The Sign of the Four was first published
in LIPINCOTT'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE in February 1890. 1 THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK
HOLMES 13 (William S. Baring-Gould ed., 1967) [hereinafter ANNOTATED HOLMES]. Dr.
Watson's disapproval of Holmes's drug use continued. In The Adventure of the Missing
Three-Quarter, first published in 1904 (2 ANNOTATED HOLMES, supra, at 475) as part of the
series which became the book, THE RETURN OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1 ANNOTATED HOLMES,
supra, at 16), Watson claims to have "gradually weaned him from that drug mania which had
threatened once to check his remarkable career." COMPLETE HOLMES, supra note 48, at 622.
But Watson admitted that "[t]he fiend was not dead but sleeping." Id.
The creator of Holmes and Watson, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, was himself a physician,
ANNOTATED HOLMES, supra, at 5-6, and practiced for a period as an ophthalmologist.
GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 36. Because the principal legitimate use for
cocaine, as a local surgical anesthetic particularly useful in optical surgery, was discovered
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(3) The Holmes stones provide a clue to Victorian attitudes toward
opiates, as well. In The Adventure of the Man With the Twisted Lip,
Watson goes to an opium den in search of an addicted friend. Watson
describes how his friend began using opium and then observes:
He found, as so many more have done, that the practice is easier to
attain than to get nd of, and for many years he continued to be a slave to
the drug, an object of mingled horror and pity to his friends and relatives.
I can see him now, with yellow, pasty face, drooping lids, and pm-point
pupils, all huddled m a chair, the wreck and rum of a noble man.50
The obvious disgust in Watson's tone reflects the sordid British
experience with opium in the nineteenth century This experience included
the Opium War of 1840-42, an episode which casts light on both European
and Chinese attitudes towards drug consumption. In the late 1700s, British
traders seeking to solve the dual problems of making the Indian province
of Bengal profitable and of finding a product the Chinese would trade
for their silk, spices, and tea5' fostered the cultivation of opium in India and
the shipment of opium to a growing population of opium smokers in
China.
5 2
The Chinese, for their part, did not welcome the drug. The import of
opium into China was prohibited on penalty "not only [of] loss of life to the
guilty person, but extirpation of his family, and the confiscation of the ship
or vessel that imports it, which is immediately burnt. 5 3 In 1839, the
Chinese made a concerted effort to suppress the opium trade, seizing, and
destroying over 20,000 chests of opium belonging to British and American
traders.54
In response, British forces bombarded and invaded coastal areas of
China. After two years of intermittent warfare, the Treaty of Nanking was
and widely publicized in medical journals in 1884, Conan Doyle would have been familiar
with its properties. Id. at 22-23.
50. COMPLETE HOLMES, supra note 48, at 229.
51. THE OPIUM WAR 4-6 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976). This book is
authored by members of the history departments of Futan University and Shanghai Teachers'
University Though laden with anti-Western rhetoric and the obligatory quotes from
Chairman Mao and Lenin, the facts it recites are not inconsistent with western sources. See
id. at 7 (quoting Lenin); see also INGLIS, supra note 33, at 225.
52. INGLIS, supra note 33, at 13-82. Ironically, one of the principal early architects of
the opium trade in Bengal, Sir Robert Clive, became an addict and died of an overdose of
laudanum, which is a medicinal preparation containing opium. Id. at 21.
53. Id. at 28.
54. THE OPIUM WAR, supra note 51, at 29.
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signed.55 Back home, the British public was aware that its government was
engaged in as discreditable an example of mercantilist imperialism as the
period had to offer. Even Lord Melbourne, who was prime minister at the
outbreak of the Opium War,56 expressed to Parliament during the debate
over China policy his concern and regret that "a system should exist which,
in the eyes of the world, identified the government of this country in some
degree with the propagation of the evils arising from the use of opium."57
The Times was less restrained. After the treaty was signed, it editorialized
that Britain should get out of the opium trade. Some moral compensation
was owed Cina, the editors wrote, "for pillaging her towns and slaughter-
ing her citizens in a quarrel which could never have arisen if we had not
been guilty of an international crime. "8
(4) In the first half of the nineteenth century, the use of opiates was
low in America and was confined primarily to medicinal prescription by
physicians until around the Civil War.59 Thereafter, the United States
experienced a rapid surge in opiate use stemming from three sources.
First, doctors created a class of morphine addicts by administering the drug
with the hypodermic syringe.' Indeed, the leading cause of addiction to
both opium and morphine throughout the nineteenth century was admmis-
tration by physicians.6" The second group of users were opium smokers,
who were disproportionately immigrants and primarily Chinese.62 The
third category of opiate users m late nineteenth century America were
consumers of patent medicines. In the decades following the Civil War,
entrepreneurs and quacks peddled a cornucopia of tonics and patent
medicines. The purveyors of these elixirs made striking claims for their
curative and invigorating powers. Many of these elixirs contained opiates,
55. Among the fruits of the treaty was British occupation under a long-term lease
agreement of the island of Hong Kong. Id. at 90-91.
56. INGLiS, supra note 33, at 182.
57 Id. at 229-30.
58. Id.
59. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 45-46.
60. Id. at 46-47 Such addicts tended to be middle- to upper-middle-class women being
treated in the home for various ailments. Id. at 36-42. Also represented among morphine
addicts of the period were Civil War veterans who became addicted while receiving treatment
for wounds. Id. at 54-55.
61. Id. at 42.
62. Expatriate Chinese workers used opium as a means of forgetting their isolation and
loneliness. American employers often used its sale to eat up Chinese workers' wages and so
maintain them in virtual serfdom. Id. at 63-64, 67-70.
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 937 (1995)
cocaine, or alcohol in varying quantities and combinations. Coca-Cola, for
example, began as one of these tonics.
Professor Carnngton is, of course, correct that Coca-Cola originally
contained cocaine. Invented in 1886 by John Styth Pemberton, a Georgia
pharmacist,63 the preparation was advertised as a "sovereign remedy" and
a refreshing drink.' 4 But by the time the federal Pure Food and Drug Act
was passed in 1906, the Coca-Cola Company had already removed the
cocaine. 65 That it did so is a testament to a notable evolution in public and
medical opinion toward both cocaine and opiates which was occurring
around the turn of the century Doctors began to discover that undesirable
side effects (primary among them rapid addiction) accompanied the gen-
uinely remarkable, and medically useful, palliative effects of cocaine and
the opiates. Doctors often made the unpleasant discovery of the addictive
properties of cocaine and morphine when they themselves were hooked.66
For example, Professor Carrngton alludes to "[o]ne of the founders
of the Johns Hopkins University Medical School [who] used the opiate mor-
phine all his adult life."'67 Presumably, Professor Carrington means to
imply that drug addiction caused neither public embarrassment nor occupa-
tional impairment to tls prominent physician. The truth was far otherwise.
Dr William Halsted of Johns Hopkins, who invented nerve block anes-
thesia, became addicted to cocaine at the time of his first anesthesia
experiments in 1884.6 This caused a "confused and unworthy period of
medical practice, ,69 followed by a year-long stay in a hospital and a
curative sailing cruise, followed by still more hospitalization. Although
this protracted course of treatment apparently cured him of the cocaine
habit, he emerged addicted to morphine, a habit against which he struggled
63. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 27
64. E. J. Kahn, The Universal Drnk, NEW YORKER, Feb. 21, 1959, at 39, 50 and Feb.
28, 1959, at 35, 36.
65. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 28.
66. Physicians of the period are thought to have abused cocaine and the opiates more
than any other occupational group. 1d. at 31. In 1901, it was estimated that 30% of the
cocaine addicts in the United States were doctors or dentists. George W Norris, A Case of
Cocain Habit of Ten Months' Duration Treated by Complete and Immediate Withdrawal of
the Drug, 1 PHILADELPHIA MED. J. 304, 304 (1901).
67 Carrington, supra note 1, at 333.
68. FLYNN, supra note 19, at 24-26. See also GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18,
at 31.
69. Wilder Penfield, Halsted of Johns Hopkins, 210 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2214, 2215
(1969). See generally id. at 2214-18.
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unsuccessfully for the rest of his life. The fact of his morphine habit was
not disclosed until 1969, forty-seven years after his death.7"
By the 1890s, physicians' observations of the travails of their col-
leagues and patients led to a swelling chorus of calls for professional self-
restraint and governmental regulation of opiates, cocaine, and other drugs.
Within the medical professions, Indiscriminate prescription of morphine for
a plethora of ills dwindled.7 Simultaneously, states and municipalities
began to respond by imposing various restrictions on the use and sale of
narcotics. As early as 1875, San Francisco passed an ordinance banning
opium smoking."2 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, many states
and localities passed laws designed to curb the abuse of cocaine and opi-
ates. 73 By 1915, twenty-seven states had statutes prohibiting or regulating
the practice of opium smoking.74 As of 1914, forty-six states had laws
controlling the sale of cocaine. 75 Between 1895 and 1915, the majority of
states and many municipalities enacted legislation prohibiting the sale of
both opiates and cocaine except to those with a valid prescription.76
The states found that their individual efforts at regulation were
ineffective because they were piecemeal.77 Consequently, Congress passed
several pieces of federal legislation, beginning with the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, which imposed labeling requirements for patent and
other medicines.7" Although the tonics and patent medicines had always
made sweeping claims of effectiveness, they usually did not offer the
customer a description of their contents. Once consumers discovered that
the active ingredients of their favorite elixirs included cocaine or opiates,
sales fell dramatically in response to increasing medical condemnation of
nonmedical use of these substances.79
70. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 31. See also KAPLAN, supra note 19,
at 136-37 (discussing Dr. Halsted's addiction).
71. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 53-54.
72. Id. at 78. Ohio passed a law against smoking opium in 1885. Ohio Laws: 1885-
1887, 82:49, February 6, 1885. The Ohio law is discussed in DAVID F MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 91 & n.i (expanded ed. 1987).
73. MUSTO, supra note 72, at 8-9.
74. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 79. Grinspoon and Bakalar place the number of
states regulating opiates by 1914 at 29. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 40.
75. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18, at 40.
76. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 53.
77 MUsTO, supra note 72, at 9-10.
78. Id. at 10. See also COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 58.
79. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 58-59, 114.
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 937 (1995)
In 1914, the Harrison Act inaugurated the modem era of increasing fed-
eral control over the manufacture and sale of narcotic drugs. What Profes-
sor Carrmgton does not mention about the Harrison Act and the other regu-
latory measures of the period is that, by any reasonable statistical measure,
they worked. The most thorough study of American opiate addiction con-
cludes that m the period of 1900 through 1914, there were never more than
313,000 opiate addicts in America 8° and that by 1920 the figure had dropped
precipitously to a number somewhere between 104,9331 and roughly
2 10 ,00 0 .' Another source reports that between 1914 and 1940, the number
of opiate and cocaine addicts dropped by an estimated eighty percent.
8 3
From the point at which the new laws took hold until the 1960s, illicit use
of opiates, cocae,84 and marijuana 5 remamed very low 86 Although some
recreational drug use persisted in the fifty years after the Harrison Act (prin-
cipally on the fringes of the socio-economic underclass), 87 the combination
of increased medical knowledge, decreased availability, social disapproba-
tion, and legal prohibition kept drug use sufficiently uncommon that it was
barely perceptible as a public concern. 8 Only in the late 1960e 9 did the
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Robert E. Peterson, Legalization: The Myth Exposed, in SEARCHING FOR ALTER-
NATIVES: DRUG CONTROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 324 (Melvin B. Krauss & Edward
P Lazear eds., 1991) [hereinafter SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES]. Peterson says that the
number of persons addicted to the opiates and cocaine dropped from over 250,000 in 1914
to 50,000 in 1940. Id. at 333.
84. DUKE& GROSS, supra note 25, at 67-68; GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 18,
at 43.
85. "Marijuana was never very popular in the general population [of the United States]
until the late 1960's." DUKE & GROSS, supra note 25, at 45.
86. MUSTO, supra note 72, at 251-53. "The use of illegal drugs increased astoundingly
in the 1960's. Drugs thought safely interred with the past, marihuana and heroin, rapidly
resurfaced at the same time that new drugs such as LSD materialized and obtained
tremendous popularity among young people." Id. at 253.
87 See, e.g., COURTWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 113-26.
88. In the years after World War I, "[f]rom being easily available and commonly used,
heroin, morphine, and cocaine almost faded out of nonmedical situations: when someone was
caught with drugs, the event elicited headlines and comment." MUSTO, supra note 72, at
251.
89 One source estimates that between 1965 and 1970, the number of active heroin
addicts in the United States grew from about 68,000 to roughly 500,000. DAVID J. BELLIS,
HEROIN AND POLITICIANS: THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC POLICY TO CONTROL ADDICTION IN
AMERICA 19 (1981).
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incidence of use of these substances begin to increase to a level which caused
national concem.90
In sum, the nineteenth and early twentieth century experience of Europe
and America with the powerful coca and opium derivatives its science had
created fell into five phases: discovery, excitement, abuse, disillusionment,
and prohibition, all crammed into a few short decades. At the end of the
day, Professor Carrington's effort to give the use of cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana deep historical roots in the United States does not wash.
Widespread recreational abuse of these three drugs by Americans is a
problem of the last third of the twentieth century Its causes are subject to
endless debate, but they certainly include the convergence of three particular
circumstances. First, modem chemistry could create the drugs. Second, in
this century, international travel and trade exploded and provided virtually
limitless opportunities to smuggle the drugs from countries where their
vegetable precursors are grown. Third, America transformed from a
predominantly rural country, in which every community had multiple formal
and informal mechanisms of social control, to an urban, fluid, increasingly
atomized society with fewer shared values and fewer nonlegal mechanisms
for transmitting and enforcing the values we share.
If, as Professor Carrington would have us do, we are to eliminate
federal regulation of cocaine, the opiates, and marijuana, the decision to do
so should be based on a clear-eyed assessment of the world as it is, and not
on nostalgia for a past which never was.
I. Back to the Future: The Twenty-First Amendment Revisited
If the view of the past through Professor Carrmgton's glass is distorted,
what of his vision of the future?9" Let us take an miaginary peek into an
90. The perception that drug usage of all types was a comparative novelty is expressed
in a number of American and British court opinions of the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g.,
People v Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983) (marijuana); see also State v Hall, 214 N.W.2d
205, 213 (Iowa 1974) (LeGrand, J., dissenting) (discussing rules regarding effect of alcohol
intoxication in criminal cases and concluding that different rules should apply to "modem
hallucinatory drugs" which had only recently come into common use); Director of Public
Prosecutions v Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, 159 (noting that, in contrast to
drunkenness, intoxication with hallucinatory drugs had been until recently "comparatively
unknown").
91. It is important to recall that Professor Carrington wants state control of drug laws,
not merely as a matter of federalism, but in order that his "Fremont" (and other like-minded
states) can adopt a series of measures legalizing the private consumption of marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin by all competent adults. He would have the state ensure a supply of these
drugs at public stores at prices low enough to undercut illegal suppliers. Carrington, supra
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imaginary Fremont. The year is 1999 The Twenty-Eighth Amendment
denying the federal government jurisdiction over marijuana, coca deriva-
tives, and the opiates was ratified in July 1996. The State of Fremont was
one of only three states that legalized marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Ten
other jurisdictions legalized marijuana. In the bill that legalized marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin, the Fremont legislature resolved to ensure a supply of
these drugs at public stores at prices low enough to undercut illegal
suppliers.'
The first problem Fremont faced was supply The state's climate was
unsuited for the cultivation of poppies or coca plants, but was ideal for
marijuana. Marijuana farms sprouted like mushrooms (although psychoac-
tive mushrooms themselves remained illegal). The legislature decided that
marijuana could be distributed by anyone holding a state liquor license, so
competing brands of cannabis sativa could be found in the cigarette
machines of every bar and liquor emporium in the state. Prices dropped.
Marijuana remained illegal for those under the age of twenty-one. The
prohibition had precisely the same effect as maintaining the legal drinking
age at twenty-one. The number of high school and underage college students
using marijuana climbed rapidly9" toward parity with the number using
alcohol: eighty-six percent among college students9' and roughly sixty
percent among twelfth graders.9' Among young adults over twenty-one, the
trend was even more pronounced. Some Fremonters expressed surprise, but
those who had opposed legalization pointed out that a similar increase had
occurred m Alaska after the state effectively decriminalized the private
consumption of marijuana by adults.96 The trend so disturbed Alaskans that
note 1, at 354-55.
92. Id.
93. In 1993, 15.5 % of high school seniors reported using marijuana in the last month.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1993 329 (1993) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1993]. Among
college students, monthly marijuana usage for seniors was 14.2%. Id. at 330.
94. Id. at 330-31. The 86% figure represents use of marijuana by college students
within the last twelve months. In 1993, 72% of college students used alcohol within the last
month.
95. Id. at 334. Among twelfth graders, 58.8% report ever having used liquor within
the past year; 63.5% have drunk beer within the past year. In another survey, 51% of high
school seniors reported drinking alcohol in the past month. Id. at 329.
96. In Ravin v State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), the Alaska Supreme Court found
that the state's ban on the consumption of marijuana by adults in their homes was a violation
of the right of privacy contained in the Alaska state constitution. Id. at 511. In the period
following the Ravin decision, studies found that Alaskan high school students were twice as
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in 1990 they passed a statewide referendum that recrimmalized cannabis.'
The same pattern of liberalization, increased use, and re-toughening of drug
laws has occurred in Sweden, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain.9"
Fremont banned commercial advertising of marijuana, but the
competing producers easily circumvented these restrictions. They advertised
in medical and chiropractic publications, cultivated relationships with the
news media to ensure free coverage, appeared regularly on talk radio and
TV, opened "informational" addresses on the Internet, and even sponsored
a regular cable television program ostensibly devoted to agricultural news.
Through all these outlets, the growers competed in producing and marketing
ever more potent strains of cannabis.
Fremont-grown marijuana began showing up m increasing quantities m
several neighboring states which had not voted for the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment and were vigorously opposed to legalization. Street dealers
from Pennsylvania and North Carolina, which bordered on Fremont, would
drive over weekly, fill their trunks with the popular "Pathfinder" brand, and
return home stocked up for a week's business.
The illegal interstate transportation of Fremont's marijuana to
Pennsylvania led to acrimonious exchanges between the two states'
governors. Similar complaints from other statehouses set off a furious
debate in the Fremont legislature. Some felt that the export of Fremont
products was good for the local economy and should be left alone. Others
took the view that Fremont's value choices should not be imposed on
residents of her sister states. The debate stalled when no one could think of,
a solution to the problem which would not involve an expensive state
regulatory scheme.
The supply problem for cocaine and herom proved far more complex.
Neither Fremont nor the other states that legalized these drugs had climates
likely to have smoked marijuana as ther peers in the lower forty-eight. Peterson, supra note
83, at 328.
The experience of the Netherlands is also instructive. Liberal law enforcement policies
m that country have led to the creation of drug cafes in which marijuana is freely and publicly
consumed. The Amsterdam cafes host an annual "Cannabis Cup," at which competing brands
of marijuana are "taste tested." See Marijuana, YALE HERALD, Dec. 2, 1994, at 16.
97 The ballot initiative, which passed with 54% of the popular vote, rewrote Alaska
Stat. Sec. 11.71.060 and made it a misdemeanor to "use or display" less than one-half pound
of marijuana. See Suit to Block New Pot Law Is Filed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at A18.
The validity of the initiative is under attack. See Judge Rejects Anti-Pot Law: Ruling Backs
Earlier Decisions Outlining a Right to Privacy, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Nov 17, 1993,
at Al.
98. Peterson, supra note 83, at 333-35.
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suitable for growing coca or poppies. Those few states with the right
climate refused to allow cultivation of the vegetable precursors of drugs
which they continued to ban. The only sources for cocaine and heroin in the
quantities necessary to carry out the policy of liberal, low-price distributiorf
were Colombian, Mexican, Sicilian, and East Asian criminal gangs. The
governor of Fremont swallowed hard and sent his personal envoy to Cali,
Colombia, and Sinaloa, Mexico.
The Cali meeting was rocky from the start. The cartel bosses
recognized a marketing opportunity but saw no reason to sell their products
so cheaply as to destroy the existing price structure in the majority of states
(and countries) where the drugs remained illegal. They offered the Fremont
State Narcotics Authority a thirty percent volume discount on cocaine and
heroin, with the State of Fremont to arrange and pay for transportation. The
Mexican traffickers offered a thirty-five percent discount, again with
Fremont picking up the cost of transport.
Transportation was more than a minor headache. Possession and sale
of marijuana and heroin remained illegal in both Colombia and Mexico.
When the State Department learned that an official of an American state was
negotiating with Mexican and Colombian criminals to deliver shipments of
substances illegal in their countries of origin, several senior Foreign Service
officers had apoplectic fits. Ultimately, the Colombians bribed the govern-
ment of a small Caribbean country to legalize transhipment of heroin and
cocaine. Drug shipments to Fremont were smuggled out of Mexico and
Colombia to this island, where they were placed on aircraft for the final
journey to Fremont. Air transport was required because Fremont was
landlocked and shared no common border with Mexico.
Because the purity and safety of drugs from criminal sources was
necessarily unpredictable, Fremont was obliged to reprocess and repackage
all of the incoming drugs. The state also set up a network of "Fremont State
Narcotics Stores," staffed by state employees. The combined costs of
transportation, processing, packaging, and testing raised the wholesale cost
of the drugs to the state to a level not dramatically lower than the wholesale
cost of the same drugs in states where they were banned. Fremont also
found that maintaining stores and employees created overhead which illegal
dealers did not carry
Fremont had planned to raise revenue by taxing cocaine and heroin, but
found that this was impossible if the illegal market was to be undercut and
prices were to be lowered far enough to remove the economic incentive for
addicts to steal to maintain their habits. Indeed, Fremonters found that to
keep prices that low, the state was obliged to sell heroin and cocaine at a
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loss. Some of the resulting revenue dram was offset by taxing the flourish-
ing indigenous marijuana industry, but Fremonters quickly concluded that
the drug business was at best a financial wash for the state.
As with marijuana, consumption of heroin and cocaine increased. It did
not reach the levels of alcohol and marijuana use, but cocaine use quadru-
pled, returning to the levels of the mid-1980s, when, for example, twenty
percent of young adults reported cocaine use in the past year. 9 Use of
cocaine and heroin remained illegal for those under twenty-one, but with
social opprobrium removed and so many more avenues for obtaining the
drugs available, usage mcreased.'0°
Fremont officials soon found that, despite the grudgingly recognized
increases in consumption among Fremonters, the amounts of marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin being sold through liquor stores and the Fremont
narcotics outlets were sufficient to keep every man, woman, and child in the
state high every day of the year. The explanation for the remarkable sales
figures became clear as the state police of Pennsylvania and other adjoining
states began finding cocaine and heroin along with the "Pathfinder" brand
of marijuana in the trunks of sojourners returning from Fremont.
The governors of the states surrounding Fremont met and agreed on a
policy of mandatory check stations on every significant highway outlet from
Fremont to check the flood of heroin and cocaine. 0' At these stations, state
police officials questioned drivers and sometimes searched all vehicles
leaving Fremont. Similar stations were created at all airports receiving
99. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 332. The reported figure is for 1986.
Reported cocaine use among young adults in 1993 was 4.7%. Id.
100. Any prediction of how many more people would use now illegal narcotics if they
were legalized is obviously speculative. Nonetheless, it is fatuous to contend that the
increased use of a substance as pleasure inducing as cocaine would not be very significant in
a world where legal constraints were removed. One scholar remarks, "Knowing the animal
and human evidence about the reinforcing properties of the various addicting drugs, it seems
quite likely to me that as many people would smoke 'crack' cocaine as now smoke tobacco -
if the legal status were the same." Avram Goldstein, Drug Policy: Some Thoughts About
Striking the Right Balance, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, at 398, 400.
Another expert, Dr. Herbert D. Kleber, estimates that legalizing cocaine would produce
20,000,000 addicts, a ten-fold increase. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., It's Drugs, Stupid, N.Y
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 29, 1995, at 41.
101. Consider the efforts by jurisdictions such as the District of Columbia to ban
handguns and how such efforts have been rendered futile by the easy availability of handguns
in adjoining states. See, e.g., Critics of Gun Control Don't Tell Whole Story About Washing-
ton, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 1994, at 10A, Why Might Gun Crimes Decline?, WASH. POST,
July 9, 1980, at A16; Lynn Roellim, Halberstam Slaying and Rising Crime Rate Are Wony-
ing the Well-Off in Washington, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 14, 1980, § 1, at 44.
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direct flights from Fremont. Fremont sued in federal court claiming
violations of the Fourth Amendment and improper restrictions on interstate
commerce. The case appears likely to drag through the year 2000.
Diversion of products from the Fremont market into "dry" states was
not limited to retail purchases. The first indictments of officials of the
Fremont State Narcotics Authority for selling heroin and cocaine to out-of-
state dealers came in late 1997 The investigations began when mid-level
Narcotics Authority bureaucrats began driving BMW's and buying vacation
homes m the Fremont mountains. In their confessions, several of the early
defendants explained that the staggering profits to be garnered by selling
drugs at Fremont-subsidized prices to dealers in "dry" states made
corruption irresistible. "After all," one of them said in extenuation, "I was
only selling products that the law of Fremont said were perfectly legal."
The second round of indictments charged North Carolina state police with
accepting bribes to let drug shipments out of Fremont pass highway
checkpoints.
The leakage of subsidized Fremont drugs into "dry" state markets put
downward pressure on prices there. Mid-level traffickers in those states
began complaining to their cartel suppliers, who responded by raising
prices to Fremont's official buyers. Reformers in the Fremont legislature
looking for ways to ease the strain on the state budget began searching for
alternative sources of supply They were opposed by the governor, who by
this time was receiving immense campaign contributions from the
"Colombian Agricultural Association" and the "Peasants and Farmers
Cooperative of Sinaloa," whose lavish offices were ensconced across the
street from the state capitol building.
Relations between Fremont and her neighbors continued to fray
Major traffickers in "dry" states began to purchase property in Fremont -
first marijuana farms, then vacation homes, then banks. All across the
country, drug investigations led to these new Fremont residents. Fremont
courts began to refuse to honor out-of-state subpoenas for bank records.
The governor of Fremont found an ever increasing number of defects in
out-of-state extradition warrants.
Fremont, like other states, had formerly adopted the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act.'0 2 The Act required merely that the crime for which
extradition was sought be a crime in the demanding state.'0 3 Under
102. A version of this act appears m Colorado statutes as COLO. REV STAT. § 16-19-101
to 16-19-132 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
103. See, e.g., People v Jackson, 502 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Colo. 1972).
960
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pressure from both the in-state marijuana farmers and the newly arrived
cocaine and heroin magnates, the Fremont legislature amended its version
of the extradition statute to require dual crimnality, a concept imported
from international extradition law which requires that the crime for which
extradition is sought be an offense in both the demanding and the requested
state. 10' "Dry" states tried to circumvent Fremont's efforts to give asylum
to persons in the drug business by asking the federal government to arrest
drug suspects in Fremont, charge them with unlawful flight to avoid
prosecution, 10 5 and arrange their removal through the federal courts.
Although this would have presented no problem before the Carrington
Amendment,10 6 political considerations made federal agencies deeply
reluctant to insert themselves into the controversy They were attacked by
Fremont officials when they acted and by officials of the demanding states
when they did not.
Outside of Fremont, there was a growing chorus calling for federal
intervention m narcotics control. "Dry" state governors pleaded for federal
help in policing the borders of Fremont and the other states where drugs
were legal. Even those states nowhere near Fremont joined the pleas.
They had found that without assistance from the DEA, the FBI, U.S.
Customs, the Border Patrol, or the Coast Guard, every mile of seacoast,
every foot of land border with Mexico, and every harbor and airport was
an open conduit for narcotics smuggling. The President replied that, while
he personally disapproved of drug use, the Twenty-Eighth Amendment had
been passed to get the. federal government out of the drug enforcement
business. Moreover, he said, fiscal realities following the enactment of
much of the Republican "Contract With America" precluded re-creating the
DEA or authorizing any sigificant new federal expenditures."17
104. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Ireland,
July 13, 1983, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-19, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 1983.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988).
106. The federal unlawful-flight-to-avoid-prosecution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988),
known by its acronym "UFAP," is commonly used to employ federal law enforcement
resources to apprehend state fugitives and return them to the jurisdiction where they are
wanted for trial. The practice is to swear out a warrant before a federal magistrate judge
charging violation of the UFAP statute, either before or after arrest, bring the fugitive before
a federal magistrate judge, and then remove the fugitive to the state from which he fled
pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. Cnm. P 40. Once the fugitive is returned to the state
seeking him, federal charges are dropped and the fugitive is relinquished to state custody
107 Professor Carrngton might respond that his amendment does not prohibit the
federal government from assisting states in the enforcement'of their own antidrug laws, or
from being active m combating the importation of drugs into "dry" states, either from abroad
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 937 (1995)
Some "dry" states responded by beefing up their police forces at the
cost of raising taxes or cutting services. Others resigned themselves to
accepting a new level of narcotics use. Meanwhile back in Fremont, though
drug use was up, internecine violence among drug sellers was down. The
illegal market was not entirely eliminated, however. Sale to persons under
twenty-one was still illegal. Moreover, illegal dealers were willing to
compete with the state on price by cutting their profit margins and on quality
by selling drugs of greater strength than government doctors thought safe.
In particular, there was a thriving black market in "crack," which the state
was unwilling to sell, but which was much desired by consumers .for its
supremely euphoric effect.
When asked by the Gallup polling organization whether the experiment
of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment had been a success in Fremont, the citi-
zens of Fremont were evenly divided. The governors of the four states bor-
dering Fremont were asked the same question, but were unable to formulate
a printable response. "Juan Valdez" (not his real name), reached at his villa
in Cali, Colombia, merely chuckled and took another sip of champagne.
Other scenarios could be drawn for Professor Carrmgton's Fremonters,
some more hospitable to his proposal, some less so. I suggest, however,
that none can be conceived which, if true to the realities of economics and
human nature, avoid teaching the following lessons:
(1) One cannot create a single-state market for an intensely pleasurable,
fungible, and easily concealable product like recreational drugs. If such
drugs are legal and cheap in one state of the United States, no earthly power,
or from states which have legalized them. The text of the amendment seems to permit this
reading. However, if the only restriction on federal "drug warriors" under the Carrington
Amendment is that the crimes they prosecute must involve movement of drugs across state
lines, the brave new world starts to look very much like the status quo. Many current federal
drug laws do not require proof of interstate nexus, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-858 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993), but in the vast majority of cases investigated by federal agencies such proof could
be easily made.
The point, of course, is that if the amendment is to operate as advertised by completely
eliminating the federal role in narcotics enforcement, those states that exercise their right to
continue prohibitions against drugs are utterly unequipped to combat criminal organizations
that penetrate them from beyond their borders. They lack both the material wherewithal to
compete with the traffickers and most of the legal tools available to a sovereign power that
are necessary to investigate and prosecute those who reside or flee out of state.
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and certainly no power available to the governments of other states, can
prevent the state where drugs are legal from becoming a major source of
supply for those states where they are not.
(2) Just as surely, one cannot eliminate the collateral harms of the drug
trade in a single state, or subset of states, particularly not by creating a state
monopoly in any one or more of the common illegal drugs.
(a) The existence of high-priced illegal markets in other states will
tend to raise prices in a "Fremont," thus retaining much of the economic
incentive for users to steal to get drugs, ensuring the survival of illegal
sellers willing to undercut the state monopoly, and reducing the prospect of
tax revenues.
(b) Placing tons of valuable drugs in the hands of poorly paid civil
servants whose job is to sell it guarantees their corruption at the hands of
those who would sell the drugs in "dry" states.
(3) Although allowing a "Fremont" the freedom to permit drugs within
its borders may please Fremonters and boost their sense of sovereignty and
independence, it tramples on the preferences of the citizens of adjoining
states who do not want drugs legalized and whose ability to exercise their
preference is subverted by having a drug supermarket in business across the
state line.
(4) In addition to the interstate conflicts created by patchwork legaliza-
tion, the problems of obtaining a supply of cocaine and heroin in particular
demonstrate that narcotics control is a matter with complex foreign policy
ramifications. If the United States is to undertake an about-face in its
approach to narcotics policy, it is the national government, not the governor
of "Fremont," or Virginia, -or Wyoming, that must speak for the country
This is truly one of those issues on which the Union must "become all one
thing, or all the other. "108
Professor Carrmgton made his modest proposal in an annual lecture
honoring John Randolph Tucker, a secessionist and defender of the right of
Southern states to maintain the "peculiar mstitution. "19 Professor Carrmg-
ton is at considerable pains to disassociate the doctrine of states' rights from
its historical employment as a tool of slaveholders (and later of segregation-
108. Abraham Lincoln, House Divided, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 461 (Roy P Basler ed., 1953).
109. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 333-37 (discussing John Randolph Tucker). The
term "peculiar institution" has been used as a euphemism for slavery since before the Civil
War. See, e.g., Alexander H. Stephens, Speech at Savannah, Georgia, March 21, 1861,
quoted in KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 127 (1962); EPic FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1867 3 (1988).
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ists)."' Although he is correct that the historical use of states' rights
arguments in the nineteenth century debates over slavery does not disqualify
the doctrine as an important governmental organizing principle, I think he
misses an important historical lesson. The existence of slavery led to the
Civil War, not only because slavery was morally repugnant and seen to be
so by the larger and more populous part of the nation but also because the
existence of different answers to so central a question in different sections
of the country was a constant corrosive of the ties which bound the sections
into a unified nation. Drug policy is by no means on the same level of moral
seriousness as human slavery, and thus differing policies from state to state
are hardly likely to lead to war. But it is not frivolous to suggest that the
friction which would.mevitably arise between "dry" and "wet" states under
a Carrington Amendment would fray the bonds of comity and mutual respect
which connect the nation.
III. "The Drug War" Abandoning a Losing Metaphor and
Learning to Thnk Clearly About Drug Crimes
Even if one finds Professor Carrington's use of history and his vision
of the future uncompelling, at the core of his argument remains the non-
frivolous contention that the costs of drug enforcement outweigh its
benefits - the powerful allegation that we have spent prodigiously, but have
failed utterly to solve our narcotics problems. One can be deeply opposed
to the recreational use of drugs and passionately convinced of their power to
destroy personalities and erode communities, and yet nod in regretful
agreement when Professor Carrington declaims the futility of a "war on
drugs."
I have long thought that the whole idea of a "war on drugs" is a sad
illustration of the dangers of governing by metaphor. The metaphor of
narcotics enforcement as warfare was first invoked by those who support a
policy of more enforcement resources and tougher penalties."' As Professor
110. Carrington, supra note 1, at 336-38.
111. Nixon was the first in a series of Presidents to invoke this term as a description for
his antidrug policies. He deemed it the Government's "all-out global war on the drug
menace." Nixon Plans to Unify Drug Enforcement Agencies, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 29, 1973,
at 26. In 1969, in a message to Congress, President Nixon called for a national attack on
narcotics abuse. President Urges a National Drive on Narcotics Use, N.Y TIMES, July 15,
1969, at 1. In 1971, President Nixon 'told Congress that drug abuse had "assumed the
dimensions of a national emergency " Dana A. Schmidt, President Orders Wider Drug Fight;
Asks $155-million, N.Y TIMES, June 18, 1971, at 1. See generally BELLIS, supra note 89,
at 18-32.
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Carrington and others have demonstrated, the warfare metaphor is now
turned against that same policy of increased enforcement by measuring the
policy against the conscious and unconscious expectations created by the
metaphor. Either use is ultimately subversive of rational discussion of drug
policy
For governmental crusaders against the bogeyman of the day, declaring
"war" carries a multitude of useful associations. Americans believe them-
selves to be essentially pacific people who can be driven to war by only the
vilest foe. It is a given that when Americans go to war in earnest, they win.
Finally, the American way of war is massive mobilization of manpower,
material, and technology 12 Thus, the warfare metaphor allows American
policymakers to emphasize the danger of the problem to be vanquished and,
where necessary, to demonize the group in opposition. It taps into the
confidence that Americans united in war will not suffer defeat. Most
important, it justifies mobilization and vast expenditure of public money
But just as selling public policy as war can create a powerful engine of
persuasion, so can it create expectations that no peacetime domestic program
can meet. Americans expect that their wars will be of limited duration.
They expect that the short-term application of maximum human, industrial,
and technological effort will produce a complete victory, after which the war
machine will be dismantled and everyone will get to go home."' Any law
enforcement initiative, whether against drugs or jaywalking, that invites
measurement by that yardstick will fail.
People sell and use drugs for the same reasons they commit the other
crimes in the criminal code - satisfaction of physical and psychic appetites,
lust, greed - the gamut of discreditable human motivations. Until men
become angels, some people will continue to break narcotics laws, in just the
same way they continue to break the laws against rape, robbery, and murder.
There is never "victory" in the criminal law The bad guys never strike their
colors, stack their arms, and surrender in a body so we can live happily ever
after. Neither does society have the luxury of surrender. If, despite our best
efforts, people keep on shoplifting, tapping the till, and sticking up 7-11's,
we do not repeal the laws against theft, embezzlement, and robbery
I recognize this begs the question, at least for the moment, of whether
taking and selling drugs is a social evil on par with crimes against persons
or property and, therefore, the question of whether drug crimes should be
112. See, e.g., RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR 4, 492-97 (1993) (discussing American approach to Persian Gulf War).
113. This national trait has been conspicuous following World War I, World War II, and
most recently, the Persian Gulf War. Id. at 490-500.
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crimes at all. My present point is simply that the success of any law
enforcement program is measured, not by the achievement of complete
success, but by the reduction of the rate of inevitable failures.
So let us beat an orderly retreat from the shot-tom fields of the
rhetorical "war on drugs." The beginning of rational discussion of drug
policy is agreement that enforcement of narcotics laws is no different than
enforcing other criminal laws. Therefore, those who support narcotics
prohibitions should stop suggesting, or even implying, that whatever new
measure they happen to be promoting will be the increment of escalation that
will finally result in "victory" over the drug pushers. Conversely, those who
oppose the direction drug policy in America has taken should stop declaring
that we have "lost" the "war on drugs" because stem enforcement measures
have not eradicated the drug trade. "
4
Instead, the debate should consider in a pragmatic way the following
considerations: the harms that drug prohibitions seek to avert; the degree to
which present enforcement efforts are succeeding in averting those harms;
the magnitude of the costs that can be. attributed to the enforcement efforts
themselves; and perhaps whether, by focusing so fixedly on enforcement, we
are foregoing tools indispensable to any effort to reduce drug abuse and its
related evils. The parties to the debate should proceed with humility, m the
frank recognition that the most dispassionate weighing of harms and costs is
unlikely to produce agreement because our powers of prediction are poor,
we lack common units of measure to compare the events we can see or
predict," 5 and our judgments about causation are, at best, open to question.
114. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The War We Are Losing, in SEARCHING FOR
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, at 53-67; Patrick Murphy, The War On Drugs Is Over (Drugs
Won): What to Do Now, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at C3.
115. For example, what is the cure of one junkie "worth"9 Or the prevention of one
birth of a crack-addicted infant? Is preventing or curing the addiction of one person, or ten
people, or a hundred "worth" the death of one police officer? Is the arrest and punishment
of one drug dealer, or ten dealers, or a hundred "worth" the fear and anxiety caused by a
single erroneous search of the home of an innocent person? Does the value of reduced
domestic drug consumption outweigh the damage to relations with South American countries
which an active policy of interdiction may cause? There are probably mid-Western academics
willing to assign dollar values to all these events for purposes of comparison, but any effort
to quantify the costs and benefits of narcotics control is doomed to failure. Because of the
very same complexities which preclude neat cost-benefit comparisons, evaluating the causal
relationships between societal costs and societal benefits in the area of narcotics control is also
difficult. The factors which impact drug usage rates are so numerous and complex that we
are not very good either at predicting the effect of particular policies on drug trafficking, or
even at ascertaining in hindsight exactly what caused historical changes in sale and use
patterns. This miasma of complex uncertainty neither renders narcotics policy unique nor
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Despite our uncertainties, as a society we must decide. The balance of
thls paper is devoted to suggesting a few points on which people of good will
and steady disposition who inhabit the real fifty states might agree m
deciding how to think about narcotics enforcement. There is nothing
particularly revolutionary about these points, except to the extent that they
suggest that a drug policy conceived as ordinary law enforcement would
please neither the "legalizers" nor the "drug warriors," but might well be
both more just and more effective than either their theories or present
reality
Thnking About Drug Crimes
(1) Drugs Are a Bummer The first point on which I think there is
broad agreement is that the use of illegal drugs, particularly cocaine and
heroin, is a bad thing that the overwhelming majority of citizens would
prevent if they could."'S The harms caused by the use of marijuana, cocaine,
and heroin include:
(a) In the case of cocaine and heroin, death from overdose;
117
(b) Damage to the health of users; 8
(c) Damage to the health of unborn and newborn children of
pregnant female users;' 9
(d) Decrease in productivity and ability to perform useful work;1
exempts us from the necessity of choosing a course. It ought, however, to engender humility
116. Even Professor Carrington does not really dispute this point. Carrmgton, supra
note 1, at 341.
117 Although Professor Carrington concedes somewhat grudgingly that drugs can be
bad for you, his overall portrayal of the effects of drug use on individuals is notably benign.
A particularly striking example is his reference to Fremonters reading of "athletes and artists"
who are seemingly unaffected by "[regular use] of cocaine." Id. at 347 One can only
wonder if Fremonters have also read of Len Bias, John Belushi, Janis Joplin, Jimmy Hendrix,
and Jim Morrison, all dead from drug overdose.
118. PHYSIOPATHOLOGY OF CANNABIS, OPIATES AND COCAINE (G.G. Nahas & C. Latour
eds., 1991); BELENKO, supra note 18, at 33-41 (effects of crack cocaine). See also Sabeh S.
Tumeh et al., Cerebral Abnormalities in Cocaine Abusers: Demonstration by SPECT
Perfusion Brain Scintigraphy, RADIOLOGY 821-24 (1990).
119. For a discussion of the dangers of illicit drugs to both unborn and young children,
see Peterson, supra note 83, at 337-38; Paul Taubman, Externalities and Decriminalization
ofDrugs, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, at 91, 97-100; Joel W Hay, The
Harm They Do to Others: A Prumer on the External Costs of Drug Abuse, in SEARCHING FOR
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, at 200, 204-13.
120. See Taubman, supra note 119, at 104-05. As for Professor Carrington's remark
that "[Fremonters] have read stories of athletes who perform extremely difficult tasks
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(e) Injuries, fatalities, and property damage from industrial and
traffic accidents;121
(f) Damage to family relationships, particularly the parent-child
relationship. 1
22
(2) Some of the Harms Caused by Drugs Result from the Fact That
They Are Illegal. Any fair minded observer will agree with Professor
Carrington that a significant, if difficult to quantify, proportion of the
harms caused by drugs are not harms to the user as a result of consumption.
They are harms integral to the business of buying and selling drugs in an
illegal market. They include:
(a) Murder, robbery, and assault of rival drug dealers or of users
unable to pay drug debts;
(b) Murders of and assaults on policemen, judges, prosecutors, and
witnesses;
(c) Street crime by those needing money to buy drugs;
(d) Corruption of public officials by drug dealers; 2 '
with superb craft while regularly using cocaine," Carrington, supra note 1, at 347, one
wonders if his Fremonters have read of Len Bias (basketball), or Dwight Gooden and Steve
Howe (baseball), or Lawrence Taylor, Dexter Manley, Bruce Smith, and Richard Dent
(football), all of whose professional sports careers are or once were endangered by drug use.
See An Empty Dream: Len Bias Dies at 22, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 73 (Bias); Doc's Second
Strike, TIME, July 11, 1994, at 63 (Gooden); Banned, NEWSwEEK, July 6, 1992, at 57
(Howe); William 0. Johnson, Hit for a Loss, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 19, 1988, at 50
(list of NFL players suspended in 1988 season for drug abuse).
121. One study found recent marijuana use in 35% of those treated in a hospital trauma
unit. Carl A. Soderstrom, et al., Marijuana and Alcohol Use among 1023 Trauma Patients,
123 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 733, 734 (1988). In addition, 16.5% of those treated had both
marijuana and alcohol in their systems. Id. at 734-35. A national study of truck driver
fatalities showed that 13% died with marijuana in their systems, a percentage equal to those
who died with alcohol in their systems. Cocaine was implicated in 8.5% of the truck
fatalities. See generally NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, FATIGUE, ALCOHOL,
DRUGS AND OTHER MEDICAL FACTORS FATAL TO DRiVER IN HEAVY TRUCK CRASHES
(1990). In a New York study, cocaine was found to have been used within 48 hours by 20%
of drivers fatally injured. Peter M. Marzuk et al., Prevalence of Recent Cocaine Use Among
Motor Vehicle Fatalities in New York City, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 250, 252 (1990).
122. For example, there appears to be a correlation between cocaine use and child abuse
and neglect. Peterson, supra note 83, at 337-38; Taubman, supra note 119, at 100. One of
the most tragic cases I ever tried as a young Deputy District Attorney involved a criminally
negligent homicide case against two parents who left their own boy and a neighbor's child
outside in a running car on a cold Colorado night while they partied inside with friends on
alcohol and drugs. The car had leaky exhaust seals; the parents emerged from the party,
drove home, and found that both boys were dead.
123. In Miami, for example, an FBI sting operation, "Operation Court Broom,"
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(e) Various financial crimes incident to concealing drug profits.
It is principally these collateral harms that legalization or decriminalization
proposals seek to eliminate.
(3) Enforcement of Drug Laws Reduces Drug Consumption. If the
narcotics law enforcement effort over the last two decades or so is viewed,
not as jihad, but as one component of an overall crime control program,
it is not at all clear that it has failed. 124 In the first place, although any
measurements of an illegal market are necessarily suspect, there is credible
evidence that consumption of illegal drugs has decreased markedly In
1979, there were an estimated 23 million users of illegal drugs; by
1988, the figure was 14.3 million, a forty percent decrease."z During the
same period, monthly cocaine use fell by fifty percent. 126 Between 1986
and 1993, reported monthly cocaine use among young adults dropped by
eighty-three percent. 27 By every available measure, the use of marijuana
by high school and college students and young adults has plummeted."
uncovered a number of judges willing to sell favors to persons believed to represent drug
traffickers. One judge was convicted of selling the name of a supposed informant in order
that he could be murdered.
124. Professor Carrington writes that since the 1980s, "[t]he sale and use of controlled
substances has remained virtually constant." Carrington, supra note 1, at 340. He provides
no authority for this claim.
125. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (NIDA), U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: 1988 POPULATION
ESTIMATES, (D-IHS Pub. No. (ADM) 89-1636, 1989) 17-21. See also Inciardi, in LEGALIZE
IT?, supra note 18, at 164 (1993) (See Fig. 1, a chart drawn from NIDA, NATIONAL
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES, 1990, reflecting large
percentage decreases in drug usage by all age groups between 1979 and 1991).
126. Inciardi, in LEGALIZE IT?, supra note 18, at 164 (see fig. 2).
127 The figure dropped from 8.2% to 1.4%. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 332.
In 1984, reported monthly use of cocaine among college students peaked at 7.6 %; by 1993,
the figure was 0.7%. Id. at 330. Cocaine use by high school seniors peaked-in 1985 at
6.7%; in 1993, the figure was 1.3%. Id. at 329.
128. Marijuana use by teenagers peaked in 1979-80, when 60% of teenagers reported its
use, but by 1992, the figure had dropped to 33%. Study by University of Michigan Institute
for Social Research, reported in Pierre Thomas, Use of Drugs By Teenagers Is Increasing,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at Al, A17 (showing increase to 38% in last two years).
Between 1981 and 1993, the number of high school students reporting marijuana use m
the last month dropped from 31.6% to 15.5%. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at
329 Between 1980 and 1993, among college students, reported marijuana use in the last
month fell from 34% to 14.2%, daily marijuana use dropped from 7.2% to 1.9%. Id. at
330. Daily teenage marijuana use fell by 75% between 1978 and 1988. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (NIDA), U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., DRUG
USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS FROM HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE,
969
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Reduction in the use of heroin has also been a notable success of antidrug
efforts. 1
29
The foregoing statistics are generated by government and academic
surveys, and it can be argued that such surveys give only a fragmentary
picture of the drug market. In the past, their heavy reliance on polling
easily accessible groups like high school and college students undoubtedly
tended to underrepresent those population groups like the inner city poor
whom experience and intuition suggest are disproportionately likely to
abuse drugs.13° However, this criticism has been taken into account in
recent versions of the surveys, and the results show the same basic pattern
of decreased usage. 31 Even if one assumes that these surveys continue to
underreport drug abuse among certain social groups, it is a peculiar argu-
ment that dismisses the notable, if incomplete, achievements of antidrug
efforts on the ground that the success has not been uniform across the social
spectrum.
Moreover, if the poor, the disadvantaged, and minorities have indeed
used drugs at rates significantly different than the rest of the population,'
3 2
that fact may lead to a rather different conclusion than Professor Carring-
ton would have us draw Such a disparity would suggest not that human
beings are unalterably genetically, historically, and socially disposed to use
AND YOUNG ADULTS POPULATIONS 1975-1988 57 (DHHS Pub. No. (ADM) 89-1638, 1989).
Between 1986 and 1993, reported marijuana use in the last month among young adults (those
between one and twelve years after high school graduation) declined from 22% to 13.4%,
daily use dropped from 4.1% to 2.4%. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 332-33.
129. See James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENTARY, Feb.
1990, at 21-23.
130. See, e.g., Inciardi & McBride, supra note 18, at 45, 62-65.
131. For example, the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) has been conducting
surveys of the nomnstitutionalized population over the age of twelve about every other year
since 1971. The data from this survey shows marijuana usage in this broader group peaked
in 1979 and by 1985 was lower than it had been in 1972. Taubman, supra note 119, at 92.
See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (Feb. 1995). In this report, the Sentencing Commission
gathers data from all available surveys. It concludes that "casual" cocaine use has decreased
"substantially," id. at 46, but that the number of heavy cocaine users remained roughly
constant between 1988 and 1991. Id.
132. In its report to Congress, the Sentencing Commission concluded that
"neighborhood-level social and environmental conditions are significant factors driving drug
abuse." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 39 (Feb. 1995). The Commission also concluded that race is
not a significant factor in drug use if social and environmental conditions are held constant.
Id. at 38-40.
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mind-altering substances, 133 but rather that drug abuse tends to occur
disproportionately in the same settings that generate high levels of other
types of criminal conduct. Once again, we see. that drug crimes are best
understood not in isolation, but in the context of the broader problem of
crime control.
(4) Enforcing Drug Laws Has Costs (ffhch Are Sometimes Exagger-
ated). Whether successful in reducing consumption or not, the current
approach to the enforcement of narcotics laws has -large tangible and
intangible costs. Notably, it costs a lot of money and consumes a large
chunk of police, prosecutorial, prison, and court resources. Moreover, the
percentage of such resources devoted to drug crimes undeniably has
increased markedly in recent years.
It is nonetheless important to understand that the magnitude and causes
of the increased resource costs of drug enforcement are routinely misrepre-
sented in debates about drug policy Consider the often noted rise in the
number of prison inmates convicted for drug offenses. In 1980, the federal
prison population was 24,661,"4 of whom twenty-five percent were serving
sentences for drug violations.' 35 The current number is approximately
85,000, sixty-one percent of whom have been convicted of some narcotics
offense. 1
36
At the state level, prison populations also have increased significantly
over the past decade or so, but drug prosecutions have made a smaller
contribution to the increase than at the federal level. For example, between
1986 and 1991, the total state prison population grew from 447,852 to
704,181, an increase of fifty-seven percent. 37 The percentage of state
inmates incarcerated for drug offenses in the same period grew ftom 8.6
percent to 21.3 percent.
31
133. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 343 ("Intoxicating effects are attractive
to most men and women "), 345 (referring to "universality and timelessness" of drug
use), and 348 ("[S]ome people are going to alter their minds one way or another.").
134. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRMUNAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1982 550 (1982) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK
1982].
135. Id. at 553. This percentage is derived from Table 6.42, which was apparently
created with data 90% complete.
136. Pierre Thomas, One Out of Four Federal Prisoners Not a U.S. Citizen, WASH.
POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al, A18. At the close of 1993, there were 79,485 federal inmates,
60% of whom had drug convictions. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 630.
137 SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 612.
138. Id. In 1991, roughly 30% of those newly incarcerated in state prisons had
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These are striking numbers. 3 9 But obscured by the leap in imprisoned
drug offenders is the equally dramatic increase in inmates serving time in
nondrug cases. If Professor Carrington's amendment were passed today
and made retroactive, freeing every federal narcotics violator, federal
prisons would still hold 34,000 inmates serving nondrug sentences, eighty-
three percent more than were serving such sentences in 1980. If there had
been no state drug prisoners in either 1986 or 1991, the state prison
population would still have risen by 144,854, or thirty-five percent during
that five-year period.
This is another way in which the "war on drugs" metaphor distorts
debate. It invites consideration of drug laws in isolation from contem-
poraneous movements in the criminal law as a whole. In fact, enhanced
narcotics enforcement has not been an isolated Calvimst crusade against the
pleasures of the masses. Harsher enforcement of drug laws has been only
one component, albeit a prominent one, of a national movement toward
tougher sanctions for all crimes.
At the federal level, the sterner approach manifested itself in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,140 which created the Umted States
Sentencing Commission.14' The Commission drafted the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 42 The Guidelines introduced determinate sentencing, which dras-
tically reduced the discretion of sentencing judges;'43 abolished parole,'
required that prisoners serve eighty-five percent of their stated sentences"4
(in contrast to the former system under which release commonly came
after roughly one-third of the stated sentence);4 6 and set sentences high
enough that only a small fraction of convicted defendants are eligible for
probation.
committed drug offenses. Id. at 625.
139. The jump in absolute prisoner numbers is mirrored in the rate of sentenced
prisoners per 100,000 population. In 1980, the combined state and federal rate was 139 per
100,000. In 1992, the rate was 330 prisoners per 100,000 population. Id. at 601.
140. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-682 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
141. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
142. The guidelines are found in the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1993).
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These measures increased real prison time for all categories of crimes.
The Guidelines have had a particularly dramatic effect on drug sentences
because of the interaction of legislative mandates, certain choices made by
the Sentencing Commssion, 47 and the determination by the Department of
Justice not to nullify the guidelines system by "bargaining around" it. '4
Still, the Guidelines and associated reforms have resulted in more
imprisonment, not just for drug traffickers, but for all those who violate
federal criminal laws.'49
147 The most influential legislative choice was the setting of rather high statutory
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes (5 and 10 years for first offenders) based on
quantity of drugs possessed. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The three important choices made by the Sentencing Commission were:
(i) to make the length of drug sentences quite long;
(2) to tie the length of sentence directly to the quantity of narcotics possessed,
distributed, or conspired about (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(3)); and
(3) to give relatively little consideration to role in the offense as a mitigating
factor (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).
The first two of these choices were necessarily heavily influenced by the legislative
creation of mandatory minimums based on quantity The legislative choice of drug quantity
as the yardstick of sentence length predisposed the commission to the same unit of
measurement. Setting mandatory minimum sentences of, for example, ten years for a
quantity of cocaine (5 kilograms) quite small by wholesale standards forced creation of a
sentencing scale which incorporated the fixed points of the mandatory minimums, and thus
virtually guaranteed that sentences for anyone connected with a significant trafficking
operation would be lengthy indeed. See U.S.S.G., ch. 1., pt. A(3), introduction cmt., in
which the Sentencing Commission notes the effect of congressional mandates on the
sentencing structure.
148. Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh formalized this decision m his
memorandum, Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act (March 13, 1989),
reprinted m THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON AND DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE 622 supp. app. 12 (1989), in which he directed that federal prosecutors were to
charge the most serious, readily provable crime and accept pleas to nothing less than one
count of the most serious, readily provable crime. Although this may not sound revolution-
ary, it was an effort to dramatically limit the range of options traditionally available in plea
negotiations. The policy was not honored everywhere and has been somewhat relaxed under
Attorney General Reno, but the change in prosecutorial culture caused by the guidelines and
the new policy was unmistakable. For an extended discussion of the evolution of the
Department of Justice plea bargaining policy before and after the Thornburgh memorandum,
see Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV 501 (1992).
149. The Guidelines have been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101
HARV L. REV 1938 (1988).
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The rise in state prison population is due primarily to a general
toughening of statutes and attitudes to crime of all types. For example, in
Colorado, where I was a state prosecutor between 1983 and 1987, the state
legislature amended the criminal code in 1985 and doubled the length of
presumptive sentences for all categories of crimes.'O The new law also
raised sentences for habitual offenders to unprecedented levels.515  Other
states have moved away from sentencing schemes that grant trial judges
broad discretion and toward determinate sentencing similar to the federal
guidelines. 1
52
The trend toward "toughness" continues unabated. On September 30,
1994, the Virginia legislature voted to abolish parole, stiffen sentences for
repeat and violent offenders,153 create voluntary sentencing guidelines, and
require that inmates serve eighty-five percent of their stated sentences. 154 As
a consequence, the state is embarking on a $2.2 billion prison building
project, 55 which is the biggest in state history 156
In sum, although stepped-up narcotics law enforcement undeniably costs
money and increases inmate populations, to attribute the country-wide surge
150. COLO. REv STAT. § 18-1-105(1)(a) (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
151. COLO. REV STAT. § 16-13-101 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994) mandated a life
sentence to one convicted of a fourth felony In Colorado, "life" means forty calendar years
without the possibility of parole. COLO. REV STAT.§ 16-13-101(2.5) (1986 & Cum. Supp.
1994).
The cumulative effect of the increased sentences was to raise Colorado's incarceration rate
from 103 prisoners per 100,000 population in 1985, to 256 per 100,000 in 1992.
SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 601. In 1993, as a result of a spiraling prison
population, the Colorado legislature reduced the maximum length of presumptive sentences
for the four lowest categories of felonies by about 25%. COLO. REV STAT. § 18-1-1-
05(1)(a)(V) (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994). In 1994, the legislature reduced habitual criminal
sentences. COLO. REV STAT. § 16-13-101 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
152. See, e.g., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, MINN. STAT. §§ 244.01- 244.16 (1992
& Supp. 1995). For an explanation of the Minnesota guidelines, see Introduction to the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV 293 (1982).
153. Michael Hardy & Jeff E. Schapiro, Assembly Passes Crime Bill - and Buck,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1994, at A-1.
154. VA. H.B. 5001. The bill was passed on Sept. 30, 1994 and signed by the governor
on Oct. 13, 1994.
155. Surplus Sites To Be Viewed for Sales: Allen Wants To Use Proceeds for Prisons,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1994, at B-3.
156. Michael Hardy, Governor Sticking to Campaign Script, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1994, at B-1. The recriminations about how all the prison cells required
by the new plan will be paid for have already begun. See Peter Baker & Donald P Baker,
Va. Prisons Swamped By Inmate Rise: Funds for Construction Fall Far Short of Need, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 1995, at D1.
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in incarceration solely, or even primarily, to the "war on drugs" is
maccurate.15
Moreover, as with antinarcotics efforts, there is some evidence
suggesting that toughness works against other categories of crime. Between
1980 and 1992, while the national prison population was growing from
353,167 to 847,271,15 the victimization rate for personal crimes dropped by
twenty-four percent, and for household crimes by thirty-two percent.159 The
decrease in the crime rate is not proportional to the increase in the prison
population; however, one would expect to find strict proportionality only
if everything else were equal, that is, if the social conditions which tend to
create persons disposed to criminality remained constant throughout the
period of heightened enforcement of drug and other crimnal laws.
If, however, the period under examination were one in which families
were under increased stress, cities were decaying, income disparities were
increasing, the quality of public education was slipping, nongovernmental
mechanisms of social control like churches and neighborhoods were losing
their authority, and the popular culture denigrated integrity and celebrated
violence, then in such a period any reduction in the crime rate might be
hailed as a monumental success of law enforcement strategy If you are
bailing a boat with one leak and managing to keep the water level in the
bilges steady, you are merely maintaining the status quo. If the same boat
springs three new leaks and you bail fast enough to get the water a little
lower than it was when you started, the boat may be floating no higher in the
water, but you are doing yeoman service as a bailer.160
157 Professor Carrington states that "the number of persons now in American prisons
is an astonishing 1.4 million." Carrington, supra note 1, at 353. He cites DUKE & GRoss,
supra note 25, at 179, as authority for this statement, but I can find no verification for it.
The most recently available statistics show a total combined population in state and federal
prisons of 847,271 as of December 31, 1992. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 600.
Even if one includes local jail prisoners in the calculation, in 1992 the total was only
1,289,160. Id. at 591, 600 (figure combines total prison population on December 31, 1992,
with average jail population during 1992).
158. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 600.
159. Id. at 247
160. In addition, I would suggest, albeit tentatively, that the strict enforcement of drug
laws has contributed to the reduction of the levels of nondrug crimes against persons and
property Both sides of the drug legalization debate have noted the positive correlation
between the commission of drug crimes and nondrug crimes. For a brief survey of some of
the literature, see Inciardi, in LEGALIZE IT?, supra note 18, at 185-90. See also Jonas, supra
note 18, at 169-71. If those who use and sell drugs are disproportionately likely, because of
personal or socio-economic factors, to commit nondrug crimes, one would expect an increase
in the incarceration of drug criminals to cause a decrease in crimes against persons and
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The same disposition to attribute the consequences of a sterner approach
to crime in general to the enforcement of drug laws infects Professor
Carrington's discussion of intangible costs. He clais that "drug law
enforcement entails frequent, even massive invasions of privacy" by police
whose conduct he likens to that of the Inquisition. 161 This allegation of an
assault on civil liberties caused by the "war on drugs" is common among
those who favor legalization. 62 It is fair to this extent: If the law makes
illegal the possession and sale of an easily concealable substance, police will
often search all the places human ingenuity can devise to hide that substance.
Given the aggressive and competitive nature of good policemen, not to
speak of the ease with which any person with power can lapse into
authoritarianism, the mere multiplication of occasions for searching caused
by the existence of drug laws is a reason for caution and concern. Although
laws against marijuana, cocaine, and herom remain, prosecutors and judges
have to be on their guard against investigative zeal coupled with the human
instinct to snoop. If drug enforcement critics were saying only this, I would
not demur. But when one begins talking about drug enforcement as the
Inquisition,' 63 a different point is being made. The plain implication is that
police are routinely exceeding constitutional limits and that the judicial
system is permiting that outcome.
Perhaps Professor Carrington, in common with many commentators,
deplores the retrenchment by the federal judiciary in recent years from the
broadest possible construction of constitutional protections for criminal
defendants. Some of the decisions embodying that retrenchment undeniably
have come in narcotics cases. But to attribute the retrenchment in whole, or
even in predominant part, to a judicial obsession with a "drug war" is, at
best, a simplistic reading of a very complex process. For example, a
reasonably dispassionate survey of the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence since, say, 1980 shows a reluctance to extend additional
constitutional protections to all classes of criminal defendants, not merely
drug offenders."
property In fact, that is exactly what has happened.
161. Carrington, supra note 1, at 351-52.
162. See, e.g., DUKE & GROSS, supra note 25, at 122-45; Kevin B. Zeese, Drug War
Forever?, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, at 251, 254, 260-61 (citing a
number of court decisions finding particular investigative methods constitutional).
163. Carrington, supra note 1, at 352.
164. For example, United States v Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), which authorized
limited investigatory detentions of persons in airports based on their correspondence to a
"drug courier profile" is obviously a narcotics case. On the other hand, the "independent
976
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(5) Treating Drug Crime As Ordinary Crime Means Rethinking Current
Sentencing Laws. Because narcotics enforcement is not war but police work,
the sentencing structure for drug offenses should be evaluated by the same
standards that are employed for other crimes. Before considering those
standards and their implications, let us clear up some common misconcep-
tions.
To begin, significant incarceration for the mere possession of personal-
use quantities of narcotics is very rare, certainly for first offenders.165 In the
federal system, only four percent of those incarcerated for drug crimes are
incarcerated for possession offenses. "
Moreover, those drug traffickers who are serving the very long federal
drug sentences that courts are indisputably meting out under current law, and
which Professor Carrington decries as "substantial violations of basic human
rights, "'67 are not nickel-and-dime-bag, comer dealers. Consider the
example of Mark Young, described by Professor Carrington as "in a federal
prison for life without possibility of parole because he amiably introduced
source" exception to the exclusionary rule was adopted in Nix v Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
448-450 (1984), a homicide case. Similarly, in Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303-18
(1985), a burglary case, the Court extended the attenuation doctrine to Miranda violations by
allowing introduction of a properly warned confession given after the police previously had
obtained an unwamed confession. One colleague has suggested that the Court began flinching
from the most rigorous possible interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as long ago as the
armed robbery prosecution at issue in Warden v Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), where the
Court permitted a search for "mere evidence" during a lawful warrantless search. Id. at 300-
01.
A more thorough demonstration of the Supreme Court's general indifference to the type
of crime at issue in its constitutional jurisprudence would be the subject of another article.
To test its accuracy, I can only suggest a review of any standard constitutional criminal
procedure casebook or, perhaps, Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEo. L.J. 597
(1994).
165. But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West 1991), which provides for
a minimum mandatory 90-day jail sentence upon conviction for being "under the influence"
of a "controlled substance." The law defines controlled substances to include cocaine and
heroin, but not marijuana. Id.
166. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 93, at 632. Based on my experience as a
prosecutor, I am confident that the overwhelming majority of that 4% fall into one of two
categories: (a) They were originally charged with trafficking offenses, but secured simple
possession convictions through a plea bargain or (b) they were charged in jurisdictions with
relatively mild drug problems under the stringent provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), which prescribes a minimum mandatory sentence of five years for mere
possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine. The remaining balance were probably
caught with the drugs in some exclusively federal enclave like a federal prison.
167 Carrington, supra note 1, at 353.
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a friend desiring to buy marijuana to another friend able to supply his
need."168 In fact, Mr. Young is not serving a life sentence. A life sentence
was originally imposed, but that sentence was reversed. 169 On resenten-
cing, the maximum penalty the court may impose under the Guidelines is
nine years. 70 After "good time" adjustments, Young will be out in less
than eight years. Whatever his sentence, Young will not be serving it
because he was the thoughtless go-between for a couple of buddies wanting
a toke. In fact, Young was convicted of acting as broker for a commercial
marijuana-growing operation. He put the Indiana growers in touch with
New York buyers who were purchasing 100 pounds of marijuana a week.
His amiability in performing this service was undoubtedly increased by the
fact that he had contracted for and received between $60,000 and $70,000
in commissions by the time of his arrest. 7 1
All that being said, there remains the question of whether either life
or nine years is an appropriate prison term for someone convicted of selling
any quantity of marijuana or of cocaine or of heroin. Precisely because
narcotics prosecution is not war but law enforcement, my own view is that
some drug sentences may be too long. But I reach that conclusion by a
very different route than does Professor Carrington. In analyzing Mr.
Young's sentence, or drug sentencing in general, we should measure the
sentences meted out against the traditional rationales for punishment of any
crime - deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution."7 ' The
first three are utilitarian considerations to which I will return in a moment.
Because Professor Carrington condemns long drug sentences as immoral,




169 The sentence was actually reversed by the Seventh Circuit twice. United States v
Young, 997 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v Young, 34 F.3d 500, 506 (7th
Cir. 1994).
170. The calculation is based on Young being found to have brokered the sale of 320
kilos of marijuana, yielding a Base Offense Level of 26, U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I(c), and having
been assessed a three-level enhancement for a management or supervisory role, U.S.S.G.
§ 3Bl.(b)l. See United States v Young, 34 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1994).
171. Young, 997 F.2d at 1206-07
172. For a succinct summary of the traditional rationales for punishment, see ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS xxvii-xxix (1976).
173. Retribution, for which a better term may be "desert" (as in "just deserts" or "he
deserved what he got"), has gone in and out of vogue as a rationale for punishment. When
in disfavor, the tendency is to equate retribution with "revenge," a term suggesting mean-
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The very long federal sentences that Professor Carrington finds mor-
ally abhorrent are for selling drugs. Thus, to the extent that the cniminal
law imposes heavy pumshment for a defendant's culpability in causing
direct harms to drug users, it does so because sellers are choosing to harm
others and not merely electing to bear the risk of harm to themselves.
The second term of the moral equation of drug sentencing is the very
cluster of collateral harms that so distresses Professor Carrington. Consid-
er but one: The hallmark of the illegal industry of winch all drug traffickers
are a part is its complete contempt for human life. As Professor Carrington
himself observes, the wholesale suppliers of cocaine wiped out virtually the
entire Colombian judiciary "74 The Sicilian Mafia, long involved in heroin
trafficking,"75 has carried on a similar campaign of assassination against
Italian judges.'76 Here in America, the murderous exchanges of inner city
drug gangs litter bodies across our urban centers every day
Those who "only" sell drugs or "merely" transport them know full
well the ugly nature of the industry for which they work. They know that
the drug irade is run by murderers, foreign and domestic. So when the
DEA arrests a legal resident Colombian, or a native-born American, m
Miami "merely transporting" 150 kilos of cocaine on one leg of its journey
from Bolivia to Colombia to Florida to cities along the East Coast, we
should suffer no moral outrage because this "mere couner" will do twenty
years.' The Colombian knows what bloody work the cartels have done
in his own country And both he and his American partners know what
bloody work is done every day in America in the course of distributing
their product. If the product were cornflakes and its distribution was
effected by such methods, they would be complicit in countless deaths.
spirited, vindictive, and uncivilized behavior. For example, the 1972 edition of the Model
Sentencing Act declares, without explanation, "Sentences should not be based upon revenge
and retribution." VON HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 46. When retributive justice is in favor,
the discussion customarily begins with Immanuel Kant's theory of deserved punishment and
proceeds in terms of restoration of moral balance. Id. at 46-55.
Unlike the Model Sentencing Act, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines clearly do not
eschew just deserts as a justification for imposing punishment. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3),
introduction cmt.
174. Carrington, supra note 1, at 352. See also Michael Isikoff, Medellin Cartel Leaders
Offered U.S. a Deal: Officials Rebuffed Plan That Sought Amnesty for Ending Drug Trade,
Providing Data on Leftists, WASH. POST, July 20, 1988, at A4.
175. DuKE & GROSS, supra note 25, at 93-96.
176. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Sicily Bomb Kills Anti-Mafia Fighter and 5 Others, N.Y
TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 1, at 9.
177 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
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To my way of thinking, Professor Carnngton betrays considerable
moral confusion when he castigates as "brutal"'7 the punishments meted
out to those who enlist for pecuniary gain in an industry whose ordinary
business practices notoriously include slaughtering judges, policemen,
competitors, unruly employees, welching customers, and, not infrequently,
innocent bystanders. If some of the drug sentences mandated under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are too long, it is not because they are
morally disproportionate to the evil in which all drug traffickers are
complicit. In the vast majority of cases, these people deserve what they
get. The question is, does it make utilitarian sense to give it to them.
Let us consider, therefore, the utilitarian justifications for punishment.
(a) Deterrence. Do criminal penalties deter people from selling drugs?
Despite endless statistical argument, nobody can prove whether they do or
not.179 As a lawyer with sixteen years experience on both sides of the
criminal law, and as a person with some experience of human nature, I
believe four (probably unprovable) things:
(1) The fear of going to prison does deter some, perhaps most, people
from committing crimes, including drug crimes.
(2) Knowledge of a high probability of going to prison for a long time
will deter even more people from committing even more crimes.
(3) There is a degree of seventy, a length of a possible prison term,
beyond which deterrence is a matter of rapidly diminishing returns.
(4) If the financial rewards of breaking the law are great enough, or
the opportunities for legal self-advancement are bleak enough, no
prospective penalty, however draconian, will deter everyone from breaking
the law
How do these beliefs apply to the current federal sentencing regime for
drug crimes? First, my own view is that by virtually guaranteeing a prison
sentence to anyone convicted of a federal drug crime, the current federal
sentencing structure does deter people from selling drugs. 8° Second, as
178. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 353.
179 I argue elsewhere that the historical evidence, particularly from the United States
at the turn of the twentieth century and during the last several decades, supports the claim
that punishment deters the use and sale of drugs. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying
text (turn of twentieth century) and notes 124-31 and accompanying text (recent history). It
is important, however, not to confuse evidence, even reasonably good evidence, with conclu-
sive proof of something as elusive and evanescent as the motivations of drug consumers.
180. As noted above, federal narcotics offenders are almost exclusively drug sellers.
Examination of the narcotics and probation sections of the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) and § 5Bl.I
reveals that only those caught selling small quantities of narcotics are even eligible for a
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word penetrates the community of potential offenders that federal narcotics
defendants not only are highly likely to serve some time in prison but are
also highly likely to serve significant time, the deterrent effect increases.
Even if one believes as I do in the deterrent power of serious punish-
ment, many drug sentences under the guidelines are of lengths far longer
than necessary to achieve maximum deterrence. Although the precise
demarcation point is obviously open to debate, my own guess (based on
years of plea negotiations and discussions with cooperating defendants) is
that the amount of time by which any sentence exceeds ten years real time
in prison is probably wasted as a deterrent. Any adult who is not deterred
by a decade m a cell is not going to be deterred by the prospect of two
decades or three or four.
At the other end of the spectrum, I think the logic of deterrence re-
quires both some prison time for convicted drug sellers, even first offen-
ders, and significant sentences for sellers of commercially significant quan-
tities. Probation, in my perhaps jaundiced view, is a bad joke. It deters no
one. The prospect of rehabilitation through probationary supervision, usu-
ally chimerical in my experience, is rendered completely illusory by the
lack of funds necessary for the kind of intense supervision which would
offer any hope of real rehabilitation. The potential financial rewards of
selling drugs are immense. Drug trafficking crimes, at least at the federal
level, are crimes of greed.' s People sell drugs because they can make far
more money doing it than they could working at any available alternative
trade. Low sentences for first-time offenders who are selling commercially
significant quantities of narcotics will not deter because the painful
consequences of being caught do not exceed the benefit to be gained from
committing the crime. Plainly stated, the possibility of a year or two in a
decently appointed federal prison, if you get caught, will do little to deter
a man who can make tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per year in
the drug business.
probationary sentence. Cases involving drug quantities which qualify for such lenient
treatment are rarely brought in federal court.
181. It is certainly true that some people sell drugs to make money to support their own
drug consumption, but such persons usually deal in quantities below the threshold amounts
necessary to draw federal attention. There is no minimum quantity of narcotics legally
necessary for federal prosecution, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-858 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), but as
a practical matter, each U.S. Attorney's Office has its own informal standards aimed at
focusing the office's resources on traffickers at the top of the local distribution chain. Retail
sellers of small quantities are rarely swept up in the federal net; they would thus be unaffected
by the Carrington Amendment.
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(b) Incapacitation. Incapacitation as a rationale for punishment rests
on the simple truth that if a criminal is in jail, he cannot commit any crimes
(at least against the general population). Thus, at least for the period he is
incarcerated, the public will not suffer the crimes the imprisoned criminal
would have committed. Incapacitation does have some role to play m
justifying lengthy prison sentences for drug offenders, but perhaps not as
great a role as one might suspect.
The idea of incapacitating the criminal population is behind the current
enthusiasm for "three strikes and you're out"82 and similar proposals for
imprisoning repeat offenders. It rests on the theory that a disproportionate
percentage of violent and property crimes are committed by a relatively
small group of offenders. Lock up this small group, goes the thinking, and
crime will decline. Whether this is true or not for street crime, it has little
application to narcotics trafficking at the wholesale level.
The difference between the two situations is that drug crime is market-
driven and street crime is not. If the system incarcerates Smith, a criminal
whose specialty is robbing convenience stores, a number of convenience
stores Smith would have robbed had he not been caught will go unrobbed.
Other criminals may rob convenience stores while Smith is in prison, but
it will not be because there is a "demand" for convenience store robberies
going unmet and the free criminals see an opportunity to fill Smith's market
niche.
By contrast, if the system incarcerates Jones, a seller of drugs, market
pressure exists to replace Jones as long as Jones's customers remain and are
desirous of purchasing drugs. Whether the demand for a seller will be
filled is dependent on two factors: First, the strength of the demand, i.e.,
how many customers there are and what prices they are willing to pay, and
second, whether potential replacements for Jones perceive that the risks of
selling drugs are worth the rewards.
Accordingly, while taking Jones out of circulation for a time is a good
thing, the reason for giving Jones a fairly long sentence is not so much to
incapacitate him as to affect the cost-benefit calculation of (i.e., deter) his
prospective replacement. The same line of reasoning leads to the con-
clusion, which I will consider again below, that narcotics enforcement
cannot be entirely a supply-side operation. Efforts to reduce demand are
a necessary concomitant to stringent penalties for suppliers.
182. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667-667.16 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). See
generally Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out" - Mandatory Life Imprisonment for
Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV 717 (1995).
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(c) Rehabilitation. Long prison sentences do not rehabilitate
anyone."8 3 On the other hand, neither do short prison sentences. Rehabili-
tation does not, in my view, enter the debate about federal narcotics
sentencing laws.
(d) Systemic Considerations. All goals of any system of punishment,
whether based on moral considerations or utilitarian ones, are subject to at
least one universal utilitarian constraint - the commumty is obliged to
pursue all the diverse aims of crimnal justice within boundaries imposed
by linuted resources. We may conclude that drug dealers are morally
repugnant and "deserve" to spend the rest of their lives mn prison. But if we
do, and if we also wish to limit the tax money spent on prisons, we may
have to release from prison others whose conduct we find even more
distasteful - robbers, rapists, and murderers.
Similarly, even if we decide, after reflection, that drug dealers are the
criminal class most deserving of incarceration, our zeal in locking up
today's drug dealers for mdefimite periods is likely to preclude us from
locking up tomorrow's dealers for much time at all. As Colorado recently
discovered, unless one is prepared to continue an endless prison-building
program, a policy of unlimited toughness is very expensive and is likely to
exceed the taxpayers' fiscal tolerance.'84
Treating drug crime as a law enforcement problem rather than as
warfare requires a different and more tenacious definition of toughness. It
requires that we abandon the illusion that imposing sentences of a "jillion"
years on the criminal we catch today will eliminate the necessity of
sentencing another cnnunal next year and the next year and the next. It
requires us to decide whether we want to incarcerate one drug dealer for
forty years, or four drug dealers for ten years, or eight drug dealers for five
years. The current approach is to incarcerate eight dealers for forty
years - and worry about the long-term costs tomorrow
183. This is my personal belief. Skepticism about the rehabilitative power of
imprisonment is common. See, e.g., CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 371-423 (1978); Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Cnminal Law,
49 YALE L.J. 987, 1009-15 (1940); Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany, Punishment:
Current Survey of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 491, 525-27 (1967); JAMES Q.
WiLsoN, THINKING ABouT CPimE 185-93 (1975). Perhaps most revealingly, in its discussion
of the "Basic Approach" which animated the formulation of the federal sentencing guidelines,
the United States Sentencing Commission mentions "just deserts," deterrence, and
incapacitation as legitimate purposes of criminal punishment, but omits any reference
whatsoever to rehabilitation. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3), introduction cmt.
184. See supra note 151.
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(6) No Category of Crime Can Be Eliminated Merely Through
Enforcement of the Crminal Law The final lesson to be learned from the
abandonment of the "war on drugs" metaphor is that the effort to reduce
drug crimes, in common with the effort to reduce crimes against persons
and property, cannot succeed unless we recognize that crime of all types is
not an isolated social phenomenon to be eradicated merely by punishing
criminals. This seems so self-evident as not to require comment. Yet, so
disillusioned have we become at the prospect of attacking the causes of
crime that a widely accepted premise in recent debates over federal anti-
crime policy is that any dollar not spent on police or prisons is "social
pork."'85 This is patent nonsense as history, logic, and experience demon-
strate.
First, although history does not demonstrate that drug prohibitions are
futile, it does illustrate a particular limitation of such prohibitions. As we
have seen, when use of opiates and cocaine grew in the late 1800s, a
program of legal prohibition and popular education reversed the trend.'86
Nonetheless, drug use was not eradicated completely; it remained a
phenomenon among the poor and the dispossessed.8 7 Drug use mush-
roomed again beginning in the 1960s.' Again, a program of increased
criminal enforcement and public education has brought usage back down,
at least among those who are stakeholders in society - the middle and
upper classes.18 9 There is simply a limit on what either the criminal law or
antidrug education can achieve among those who place little value on their
lives, who see few prospects for gaining a place in society, and for whom
prison carries no stigma and holds no terror.
The lesson of history is reinforced by the logic of deterrence.
Criminal sanctions aimed, as ours are, primarily at sellers of drugs are only
effective as part of a program that seeks to raise the disincentives to replace
imprisoned dealers while at the same time reducing the market demand for
drugs by reducing the population of users.
185. Opponents of the 1994 Crime Bill labeled all of its components aimed at crime
prevention, rather than at apprehension and punishment of offenders, as "social pork." See
Helen Dewar, GOP Crime Strategy Fails: Conservatives Pushed, Moderates Pulled Away,
WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1994, Final Ed., at Al.
186. Supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 86.
189 See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text. See BELENKO, supra note 18, at
54 ("Crack appears to have been adopted as a drug of choice among sub-populations with
multiple social and behavioral problems.").
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I am a prosecutor, not a social scientist. I am not competent to
prescribe the precise mix of drug treatment, government intervention in the
inner city, free-market capitalist econoic opportunity, and personal and
community spiritual regeneration that is needed to reduce drug and non-
drug crime to levels that would restore our lost sense of security What
sixteen years in the trenches of the criminal law have taught me, however,
is that although what I do is useful, effective within its inherent limits, and
necessary, it is not sufficient. That we are discouraged over the seenng
failure of efforts to eradicate the poverty and social decay which breed both
drug crime and street crime does not remove the imperative of rethinking
the prevention side of the crime equation and trying again.
IV Conclusion
In some ways, the "drug problem" is a convenient scapegoat for both
ends of the political spectrum. On the left, decrying the "brutality" of drug
laws, and their allegedly disproportionate impact on minorities, allows
evasion of the hard question of whether promoting a culture that exalts
individual rights and entitlements over personal responsibility and
community cohesion has contributed heavily to the social disintegration in
which drug use flourishes. On the right, blaming all the ills of the inner
city, and increasingly of the suburbs and smaller communities, on drugs or
drug dealers permits avoidance of serious discussion of the complex causes
of all crime, which prominently include poverty, unequal opportunity, and
social injustice.
In the drug debate, both the legalizers like Professor Carrington and
the unreconstructed "drug warriors" tend to exaggerate the likely effects of
their preferred nostrums. Neither legalization nor the most draconian
punishments will eliminate drug abuse. Likewise, even if by some miracle
all intoxicating drugs were to vanish from the earth, the social ills generally
laid at the feet of drugs would remain - less virulent perhaps, but still with
US.
The most notable feature of the current American public debate about
drug crime and crime in general is its increasing unreality The discussion
is largely about symbolic issues such as the death penalty that have only the
most tangential impact on everyday crime or everyday police work. Those
closest to the workaday realities of drug law enforcement and drug
treatment are rarely asked their views. The views of such professionals,
when aired at all, are politely, but resolutely, ignored. The national debate
has degenerated into a bidding war between left and right to see who can
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propose the severest federal sentences for the largest number of crimes,
irrespective of whether police, prosecutors, judges, or anyone else with
expertise in the field thinks these measures are desirable.
At the end of the day, the solution to America's drug and crime
problems lies, not in constitutional fixes or the utopia of Fremont, but in
hard-headed, tenacious policies that punish those who break society's laws
and that consciously seek to heal the society that produces the law-
breakers.
